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Thurgood Marshall and the Holy Grail-
The Due Process Jurisprudence of a
Consummate Jurist
Richard H. W. Maloy*
I. INTRODUCTION
Legend has it that Joseph of Arimathea caught Christ's blood in a cup used at
the Last Supper.' Joseph kept the vessel; and men have been searching for it ever
since.2 During the Arthurian Age, Sir Thomas Malory wrote about Lancelot
leaving Camelot to find the Grail; however, Lancelot only encountered personal
failure.' While no one knows where the Grail is, or what it is, or even if it ever
existed, the Grail has been sought throughout the ages. It has been suggested that
"[tihe home of the Grail is properly in the uncharted country of the soul," and this
is probably correct.4
The man christened Thoroughgood Marshall5 found the Grail in his soul and
his interpretation of thirty-eight words of the United States Constitution.6 Justice
Marshall came from a more humble background than most of his predecessors on
the Court, and was in fact the first member of the Court whose ancestors were
African slaves.7 Thurgood Marshall brought to the Court a viewpoint which, if not
* Richard H. W. Maloy, Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami,
Florida. My thanks to recent St. Thomas graduate, Betty-Ann Bryce, who, while she was my Research
Assistant, accumulated for me all of Justice Marshall's opinions; to my present Research Assistant,
Cynthia Lynne, 2L at St. Thomas, who helped so much in the preparation of this paper, and to St.
Thomas Professor Peter Margulies, who read an early draft of the paper and made valuable suggestions.
1. See JOHN MATrHEWS, THE GRAIL: QUEST FOR THE ETERNAL 5 (1981).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 13.
4. See id. at 20.
5. When Justice Marshall was in elementary school he decided his name was too long, and had
his "mama" change it. See CARL T. ROwAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS 40 (1993).
6. "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ......
U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall.., deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. See ROwAN, supra note 5, at 34.
exactly street-hardened,8 represented a side of American life the Court had not
previously been exposed to first-hand.9 With influence from Justice Marshall, the
Court began to take a look at much of its philosophy which, before Justice
Marshall's presence, had been de rigueur. While perhaps equally interesting, none
of JusticeMarshall's opinions were more thought provoking than those concerning
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.'°
Much has been written about Justice Marshall's prowess as a crusader for civil
rights, both as a trial lawyer and as a judge. The purpose of this Article is not to
revisit that well documented part of his life," but to attempt to analyze the depth
8. Justice Marshall came from a two parent family. His father was a hard-working waiter and his
mother a teacher for thirty years. See id.
9. "It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the Constitution requires. But it is
disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded assumptions about
how people live." United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10. Even if Justice Marshall agreed with the decision of the Court, he would write a concurring
opinion if he thought that the majority opinion did not sufficiently elucidate a certain point of law.
Justice Marshall wrote separately in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299
(1986), because he was concerned that certain portions of the Court's opinion might be misread as to
the amount of damages authorized by the Civil Rights statute. See id. at 313 (Marshall, J., concurring).
In Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971), Justice Marshall wrote separately because he thought
that the Court's opinion might be interpreted as an approval of a State's apparent attempt to legislate its
citizens' thoughts. See id. at 209-10 (Marshall, J., concurring). In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), the Court ordered the release of voir dire proceedings in the
case of an African American on trial for the alleged rape of a teenage white girl. See id. at 511-13.
Justice Marshall concurred, but wrote separately "to stress that the constitutional rights of the public
and press to access to all aspects of criminal trials are not diminished in cases in which 'deeply personal
matters' are likely to be elicited." See id. at 520 (Marshall, J., concurring). At times Justice Marshall
dissented because he believed the Court did not sufficiently instruct on due process. In Board of
Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), the Court held that a medical student who was fully
informed of faculty dissatisfaction with her clinical progress was accorded all the process she was due
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 85. Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority opinion
because he thought the Court should remand the case for consideration of substantive due process. See
id. at 97 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He wrote:
[R]esolution of this case under our traditional approach does not turn on whether the dismissal
of respondent is characterized as one for "academic" or "disciplinary" reasons. In my view,
the effort to apply such labels does little to advance the due process inquiry, as is indicated by
examination of the facts of this case.
Id. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall criticized the
Court's "reliance on labels [which] should not be a substitute for sensitive consideration of the
procedures required by due process." See id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (1985), Justice Marshall again wrote separately because the
Court had "not attempted any systematic explanation of when due process requires contemporaneous
reasons to be given for final decisions, or for steps in the decision making process, that affect protected
liberty or property interests." See id. at 617 (Marshall, J., concurring). In Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), Justice Marshall wrote a separate opinion because he
believed that the Due Process Clause entitled the Respondents to more than they asked for. See id. at
548 (Marshall, J., concurring).
11. In fact for the purposes of this Article, Justice Blackmun's dissent in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), will suffice. Justice Blackmun wrote:
I join JUSTICE MARSHALL's perceptive and incisive opinion revealing great sensitivity
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of the man's fibre as a jurist. Most of Justice Marshall's opinions dealt with
procedural due process, and the word best describing his handling of procedural
due process is the essential need for fairness.2 For Justice Marshall, fairness
required a consideration of all interests involved in a situation, regardless of the
persons or entities involved. 3 In his own words, "[a]s its very terms make
manifest, the Due Process Clause is first and foremost a guarantor of process. It
embodies a commitment to procedural regularity independent of result."' 4 As his
opinions establish, particularly his dissenting opinions, the process passes
constitutional muster only if it assuresfairness and is not unnecessarily delayed. 5
Justice Marshall stated the following:
Courts... do not sit or act in a social vacuum. Moral philosophers may debate
whether certain inequalities are absolute wrongs, but history makes clear that
constitutional principles of equality, like constitutional principles of liberty,
property, and due process, evolve over time; what once was a "natural" and "self-
evident" ordering later comes to be seen as an artificial and invidious constraint on
human potential and freedom.'6
With regard to substantive due process Justice Marshall adopted a "rational
and reasonable" standard. 7 This test has many of the same characteristics as the
toward those who have suffered the pains of economic discrimination in the construction
trades for so long.
I never thought that I would live to see the day when the city of Richmond, Virginia, the
cradle of the Old Confederacy, sought on its own, within a narrow confine, to lessen the stark
impact of persistent discrimination. But Richmond, to its great credit, acted. Yet this Court,
the supposed bastion of equality, strikes down Richmond's efforts as though discrimination
had never existed or was not demonstrated in this particular litigation. JUSTICE MARSHALL
convincingly discloses the fallacy and the shallowness of that approach.
Id. 488 U.S. at 561 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
12. In Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977), Justice Marshall referred to fairness as a
"precious constitutional right." See id. at 565 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
13. Justice Marshall did not believe that he was prevented from considering a due process question
merely because a case was said to be moot. "For a case to be moot it must be 'absolutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur."' Indiana Employment Sec. Div.
v. Bumey, 409 U.S. 540, 546 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). He would not, however, manufacture
a due process argument where it did not exist. In United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371 (1978), Justice
Marshall said: "we need not concern ourselves with these potential constitutional difficulties because
a construction that avoids them is virtually compelled by the language and structure of the statute." See
id. at 374.
14. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 764 (1979).
15. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 486 (1984).
16. City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985).
17. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451,
477 (1985).
"fairness" test.18
It is likely that the indignities suffered by African-Americans generally, and
the personal rejections Justice Marshall experienced due to the pigment in his skin,
had an effect on his thinking as a jurist. Justice Marshall had an innate sense of
what constituted fairness and an uncanny ability to discern what was right from
wrong. Justice Marshall was a consummate jurist who found the Holy Grail!
After a brief review of due process jurisprudence at the time Justice Marshall
became a Supreme Court Justice, this Article will examine the opinions Justice
Marshall wrote about due process of law, and conclude with his appeal for future
jurists to follow his lead.
II. DUE PROCESS AT THE TIME JUSTICE MARSHALL BECAME A SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE
Due process of law is not a concept that developed quickly in the annals of
United States constitutional jurisprudence. Sixty-four years after the Fifth
Amendment was adopted, the Supreme Court was still uncertain as to the meaning
of "due process."' 9 John Marshall's Court was certain that the liberty safe-guarded
18. While not explicitly using the terms "substantive" and "procedural" due process in the
Atchison, Topeka case, there is little doubt that the federal statute in question was tested under
substantive due process of the Fifth Amendment. See id. To fully understand the "rational and
reasoned" test, reference must be made to Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972), a case involving the constitutionality of the death penalty. See id. at 314; infra
notes 103-08 and accompanying text. In Furman, Justice Marshall said that the state statute involved
passed the "rational basis" test of the Fourteenth Amendment-substantive due process. See Furman,
408 U.S. at 359 n.141 (Marshall, J., concurring). However, Justice Marshall believed that the statute
offended the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See id. Justice Marshall
equated denial of substantive due process with cruel and unusual punishment, because the primary
purpose of both constitutional protections is to assure that "punishment may not be more severe than
is necessary to serve the legitimate interests of the State." See id. at 359-60 n.141 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). When Justice Marshall made his determinations under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, he rejected the rational basis test used by the majority, and applied the strict scrutiny
standard. See infra notes 262-91 and accompanying text. The objective of strict scrutiny in Equal
Protection cases is to determine whetherfairness was applied at the initial tribunal. It is clear from
Justice Marshall's Equal Protection opinions, which are considered in this Article, that Justice Marshall
blended a large measure of due process jurisprudence when making his equal protection analysis.
19. In Murray's Lessees v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855),
the Court considered an action in ejectment. Justice Curtis wrote: "To what principles.., are we to
resort to ascertain whether this process, enacted by congress, is due process?" Id. at 276-77. Indulging
in a bit of classic circuity, he had previously written: "The words, 'due process of law,' were
undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words 'by the law of the land,' in [the] Magna
Charta. Lord Coke, in his commentary on those words, says they mean due process of law." See id.
at 276 (citations omitted). The states enacted those words from the Magna Charta into their charters.
See Bank of Colum. v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235, 244 (1819).
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by the Fifth Amendment was not extended to the individual states.2 ° Nine years
after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the Court still did not have a clear
concept of the term."' In 1884, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not require that a Grand Jury indict a man prior to his being tried for murder.22 At
the turn of the century, it was recognized that the "'Constitution contains no
description of those processes which it was intended to allow or forbid. It does not
even declare what principles are to be applied to ascertain whether it be due
process.' 2 3 A few years later, the Court said that "[flew phrases of the law are so
20. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S.
243 (1833):
Had the people of the several states, or any of them, required changes in their
constitutions; had they required additional safeguards to liberty from the apprehended
encroachments of their particular governments: the remedy was in their own hands, and would
have been applied by themselves. A convention would have been assembled by the
discontented state, and the required improvements would have been made by itself.... Had
the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on the powers of the state
governments, they would have imitated the framers of the original constitution, and have
expressed that intention.
Id. at 249-50.
21. In Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877) Justice Miller said:
It must be confessed ... that the constitutional meaning or value of the phrase "due
process of law," remains to-day without that satisfactory precision of definition which judicial
decisions have given to nearly all the other guarantees of personal fights found in the
constitutions of the several States and of the United States.
Id. at 10 1-02. Justice Miller was perfectly willing to leave the task of defining the term to the crucible
of litigation. See id. at 104.
[A]part from the imminent risk of a failure to give any definition which would be at once
perspicuous, comprehensive, and satisfactory, there is wisdom, we think, in the ascertaining
of the intent and application of such an important phrase in the Federal Constitution, by the
gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall
require, with the reasoning on which such decisions may be founded. This court is, after an
experience of nearly a century, still engaged in defining the obligation of contracts, the
regulation of commerce, and other powers conferred on the Federal government, or limitations
imposed upon the States.
Id.
22. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the Court could be no more definite than to
state that: "a process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law,
if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country; but it by no means
follows that nothing else can be due process of law." See id. at 528.
23. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390 (1898) (quoting Murray's Lessees, 59 U.S. at 276).
[T]he law is, to a certain extent, a progressive science; that, in some of the States, methods of
procedure, which at the time the Constitution was adopted were deemed essential to the
protection and safery [sic] of the people, or to the liberty of the citizen, have been found to be
no longer necessary.
Id. at 385-86. Sixty-six years later, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), the
Court indicated that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected defendants against
293
elusive of exact apprehension as this."24 As far as procedural due process was
concerned, states were "substantially unrestricted" by the Due Process Clause.25
With regard to substantive due process, in 1927 Justice Holmes delivered his
famous "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough" opinion to the effect that a
feeble-minded person was not denied due process of law in having a salpingectomy
performed upon her.26 Just before Justice Marshall's appointment, Justice William
0. Douglas, an earlier champion of due process, revealed that the boundaries of
the concept were far from fixed,27 stating that whatever its boundaries, due process
was still a "mixed bag. 2 s
Early in his Supreme Court career Justice Marshall relied upon Chief Justice
Warren's description of due process of law:
29
"Due process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its
content varies according to specific factual contexts.... Whether the Constitution
requires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a
complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the
proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations which
must be taken into account.
30
Justice Marshall soon set out to give due process of law his own, more definable,
character.
self incrimination apart from the clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 64-65.
24. Twining v. State of New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964). "This court has never attempted to define with precision the words 'due process of
law."' Id. at 101-02 (quoting Holden, 169 U.S. at 369).
25. See Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912). "When the essential elements of a
court having jurisdiction in which an opportunity for a hearing is afforded are present, the power of a
state over its methods of procedure is substantially unrestricted by the due process clause of the
Constitution." See id.
26. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
27. In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), Justice Douglas rather
diplomatically wrote that the Court had never "restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was
at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights." See id. at 669. In 1956, Justice Felix
Frankfurter, concurring in Griffin v. People of the State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) said: "'Due
Process' is, perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law-the least confined to history and the most
absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society." See id. at 20-21 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
28. In West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904), overruled in part by Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965), the Court held that it was not a violation of due process to allow the introduction of the
deposition of an absent witness. See id. at 266-67. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144 (1938), in dictum, the Court said "that a statute would deny due process which precluded the
disproof in judicial proceedings of all facts that would show or tend to show that a statute deprived the
suitor of life, liberty or property." See id. at 152. Adamson v. People of California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947), overruled inpart by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), permitted the prosecution to comment
on the failure of a defendant to testify, despite a due process objection. See id. at 48.
29. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
30. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,426 (1969) (quoting Hannah, 363 U.S. at 442).
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1I. THE ELEMENTS OF FAIRNESS
To imply that Justice Marshall was writing on a clean slate would understate
the precedents he found upon his appointment to the Court in 1967. By the time
he retired in 1991, however, Justice Marshall exposed a dimension of due process
of law not previously discussed. This dimension, which extended to so many
different types of cases, is difficult to qualify, and virtually impossible to
quantify. 3' Due process gauges were not ipso facto a part of his due process
jurisprudence, but he never shied away from exploring whether minimum due
process requirements were met in a given case.32 In some situations, Justice
Marshall was an absolutist, while in other situations he believed that due process
required a certain symmetry of disposition. Justice Marshall did not often refer to
due process in his opinions, though its theme guided his opinions because due
process of law was an important part of Justice Marshall's jurisprudence.33
A. Governing Principles
1. Due Process is Not Result-Oriented
Justice Marshall was unmoved when a flawed due process procedure achieved
a correct result. According to Justice Marshall, if it was possible that a procedure
could lead to an improper result, the procedure was notfair, and due process was
31. Considered in this Article are 162 of those cases.
32. The majority in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), an immigration case, held that a
court's function in this type of case "is limited to determining whether the procedures meet the essential
standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause and does not extend to imposing procedures that
merely displace congressional choices of policy." See id. at 34-35. Justice Marshall concurred with
the Court's holding that the Immigration and Nationality Act permitted the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to proceed against the respondent in an "exclusion" hearing, but he added:
The question then remains whether the exclusion proceeding held in this case satisfied the
minimum requirements of the Due Process Clause. While I agree that the court need not
decide the precise contours of the process that would be constitutionally sufficient, I would not
hesitate to decide that the process accorded Plasencia was insufficient.
Id. at 38 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall thought that because the plaintiff had not been
given adequate and timely notice of the charges against her, and of her right to retain counsel and
present a defense, she was denied constitutional protection. See id. at 39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. During deliberation of a case which questioned the constitutionality of a state statute allowing
churches to veto applications for liquor licenses in their vicinity, Justice Marshall wrote along the
margin of a draft of Chief Justice Burger's opinion: "?? Church + state. I like plain old due process."
MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME
COURT, 1961-1991 63 (1997).
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denied.34 For example, Justice Marshall believed that the exclusion of a criminal
defendant from a hearing held to determine whether minor sodomy victims were
competent to testify at the defendant's trial should not be judged on the basis of
what transpired during the hearing, but what might have transpired.35 Furthermore,
Justice Marshall believed that a procedure which provided the possibility of an
increased punishment upon retrial denied due process.36 Similarly, an improperly
instructed jury denies a defendant due process, regardless of whether the jury
would have returned the same verdict had there been a properly instructed jury.37
Moreover, Justice Marshall also held that the State's failure to disclose evidence
cannot be judged on the basis of whether the result of the trial would have been
different had it been disclosed.38 Justice Marshall applied a similar rule in a
situation where the majority of the Court held that the Due Process Clause was not
violated by excluding jurors whose opposition to the death penalty was so strong
that it would prevent, or substantially impair, their sentencing duties. 9 Justice
34. In Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986), a case involving courtroom security, he said that
"close judicial scrutiny" looks to "whether an unacceptable risk of impermissible factors" is presented,
rather than what actually happens in a case. See id. at 570 (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,
505 (1976)). In Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987), he chided the Court for its analysis being
"result-oriented." See id. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Hilton demonstrates that Justice Marshall
dealt with extant facts and did not contemplate what might occur in the future. "The fact that the ruling
might later be reversed does not diminish its current validity. We do not discount federal-court rulings
simply because they 'may be overturned on appeal"'. Id. at 784 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730,745 (1987). "The propriety of the decision to exclude
the respondent from this critical stage of his trial should not be evaluated in light of what transpired in
his absence. To do so transforms the issue from whether a due process violation has occurred into
whether the violation was harmless." Id.
36. See Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 803-04 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 864 (2d Cir. 1965) (figuring very prominently in Justice Marshall's
attempt to incorporate the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment).
37. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 389-98 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall wrote:
[lt violates due process to affirm his sentence "simply on the frail conjecture that ajury might
have imposed a sentence equally as harsh" had they been properly instructed[]. To ignore a
reasonable possibility that jurors were misled about the range of mitigating evidence that they
could consider is to undermine confidence that thejury actually decided that Boyde should be
sentenced to death in accordance with the law.
Id. at 398 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980) (emphasis
in original)).
38. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) Justice Marshall wrote that "[w]henever the
Government fails, in response to a request, to disclose impeachment evidence relating to the credibility
of its key witnesses, the truth-finding process of trial is necessarily thrown askew." See id. at 690. In
such situations, Justice Marshall believed it is the reliability of the verdict that suffers. See id. at 690-
91.
39. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184-206 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall called the ruling "a blatant disregard for the rights of a capital defendant [which] offends logic,
fairness, and the Constitution." See id. at 185 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The fact that no member of
the jury might have been anything but partial, or that a "non-biased" selection procedure might have
left the defendant with a jury composed of the very same individuals who actually sat on his panel did
not alter the fact that it was the method, not the end result, which failed to pass constitutional muster.
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Marshall made an exception to the rule, however, where the probability of harm to
the defendant was highly unlikely.'
2. All of Society is Involved in Denial of Due Process
Justice Marshall believed that when a certain element of the populous is
excluded from the judicial process, those who suffer are not just the persons
discriminated against, but society as a whole.4 Justice Marshall further extended
See id. at 193-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall was "puzzled by the difficulty that the
majority has in understanding the 'logic of the argument."' See id. at 194 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 178). Justice Marshall noted that the Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510 (1968), opined that there might be two juries-one to determine guilt, and the other (from
which those opposed to the death penalty were excluded) to determine the penalty. Id. at 203-04
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated:
The only two reasons that the Court [in this case] invokes to justify the State's use of a single
jury are efficient trial management and concern that a defendant at his sentencing proceedings
may be able to profit from "residual doubts" troubling jurors who have sat through the guilt
phase of his trial. The first of these purported justifications is merely unconvincing. The
second is offensive.
Id. at 204 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982), in
which the Court, through Justice Marshall, rejected a pre-enforcement challenge to a drug paraphernalia
ordinance on the ground that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 495-97. Justice
Marshall wrote: 'The theoretical possibility that the village will enforce its ordinance against a paper
clip placed next to Rolling Stone magazine.., is of no due process significance unless the possibility
ripens into a prosecution." Id. at 503-04 n.21.
41. See Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall wrote that "injury caused by race and sex discrimination in the formation of grand and petit
juries is measured not only in terms of the actual prejudice caused to individual defendants, but also
in terms of the injury done to public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process." Id.; see also
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). "With respect to the issue whether petitioner himself was harmed
by the violation, the majority concludes that discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman 'can
have little, if indeed any, appreciable effect upon the defendant's 'due process right to fundamental
fairness."' Hobby, 468 U.S. at 354 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 345). Justice Marshall
mentioned that the majority had attempted to distinguish Peters:
To buttress this distinction, the majority observes that "[u]nlike the grand jury itself, the office
of grand jury foreman is not a creature of the Constitution" but was "originally instituted by
statute for the convenience of the court." This observation is useful, I suppose, as a revelation
of antiquarian fact; however, it is utterly unconvincing as an explanation of why we must
presume, as a matter of law, that discrimination in the selection of grand jury foremen can
have no appreciable effect upon a defendant's right to fair proceedings. Neither the United
States district courts nor the United States courts of appeals are creatures of the Constitution;
both were established pursuant to statute. I assume, however, that their legislative as opposed
to constitutional origins does not attenuate their crucial importance in the federal judicial
scheme.
Id. at 354-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Hobby, 468 U.S. at 344). Justice Marshall further
stated:
this concept to include situations where a juror was not excluded from the panel,
but should have been.42
There is, moreover, another consideration that the majority fails to address: the peculiar
difficulty of detecting the harm caused by racist and sexist practices in the administration of
criminal justice. We recognized in Peters v. Kiff, that it is in the nature of discriminatory
selection processes "that proof of actual harm, or lack of harm, is virtually impossible to
adduce."
Id. at 358 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Peters, 407 U.S. at 504).
42. In Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), the Court held that due process was not denied when
a person applying for a job in the prosecutor's office was left on the jury. See id. at 221. Justice
Marshall, in dissent, wrote that "[tlhe Court has insisted that defendants be given a fair and meaningful
opportunity during voir dire to determine whether prospective jurors are biased-even if they have no
specific prior knowledge of bias." See id. at 225 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The Court has also insisted that the jury be selected from a representative cross-section
of the community .... The right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community
extends even to defendants who are not members of the excluded class. In Peters v. Kiff,
[citation ommitted], the defendant challenging the exclusion of blacks was white; in Taylor
v. Louisiana, [citation ommitted], the defendant challenging the exclusion of women was
male. Exclusion is impermissible, not simply because jurors who are not members of the
defendant's class may be prejudiced against the defendant, but also because the jury would be
deprived of a "perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case
that may be presented."
Id. at 226 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall continued:
To summarize, the Court has required inquiry into prejudice even when there was no
evidence that a particularjuror was biased; has regarded the absence of a balanced perspective,
and not simply the existence of bias against defendant, as a cognizable form of prejudice; has
not always required a particularized showing of prejudice; and has strongly presumed that
contact with a juror initiated by a third party is prejudicial. In this case, where there was
evidence that juror Smith had a serious conflict of interest, and where that conflict would
inevitably distort his perspective on the case, the majority nevertheless holds that the juror's
simple assertion, after the verdict, that he was not biased sufficiently protects respondent's
right to trial by an impartial jury. This holding is utterly inconsistent with the Court's
historical recognition of this "most priceless" right.
Id. at 228 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Irvin v. Dawd, 366 U.S. 717, 721 (1961)).
Justice Marshall "believe[d] that in cases like.this one, where the probability of bias is very high,
and where the evidence adduced at a hearing can offer little assurance that prejudice does not exist, the
juror should be deemed biased as a matter of law." Id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, Justice Marshall concluded in his dissent:
The majority concedes that due process means an unbiased jury, "capable and willing to
decide the case solely on the evidence." All respondent has asked for is the opportunity to be
tried by such a jury. If the prosecutors had taken the simple step of informing the trial judge
that Smith had applied for employment with their office, Smith could have been replaced, and
respondent would have received an opportunity to be tried by an impartial jury. Because the
prosecutors intentionally failed to so, however, a juror who was almost certainly prejudiced
against the respondent participated in the deliberations. If due process really does mean a full
and fair opportunity to be tried by an unbiased jury, "capable and willing to decide the case
solely on the evidence"-then in this case, due process has been denied.
Id. at 244 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 217).
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3. Governmental Action is Interpreted Broadly
Where the government is so "intertwined" in the action that it authorizes it,
conducts it and adopts its results, it is governmental action,4 3 and hence subject to
the requirements of due process.' Justice Marshall endorsed this broad definition
of state action and considered the more restrictive version of state action, which
prior Supreme Court decisions had espoused, as simply "empty formalism.""
Historically, if state action was found, states received considerable latitude
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," yet always subject
to the fairness standard in procedural due process situations.47
43. See O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 13 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). This was a per curiam
determination to stay action on petitions for certiorari in light of the traditional right of a political
convention to review and act upon the recommendations of the Credential Committee. See id. at 2.
Justice Marshall was for assuming jurisdiction and resolving the matter due to important due process
questions, but because the Court did not reach the question, he refrained from expressing his views on
the merits of the due process challenge. See id. at 13. Even if the Credentials Committee did not deny
the petitioners due process, there were other federally protected rights which should have been
addressed by the Court, in Justice Marshall's view. See id. at 14.
44. See id. at 13.
45. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), in which Justice Marshall wrote that "[t]he
decision in this case marks a return to empty formalism in state action doctrine. Because I believe that
the state action requirement must be given a more sensitive and flexible interpretation than the majority
offers, I dissent." See id. at 852 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609,625 (1981); Exxon Corp. v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Rev., 447 U.S. 207, 229-30 (1980).
47. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a state
to allow a monopoly to be established is a major, but acceptable decision under the proper
circumstances. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 366 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Encompassed within this policy is the State's determination not to permit governmental
competition with the selected private company. See id. at 368 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "[W]hen the
activity in question is of such public importance that the State invariably either provides the service
itself or permits private companies to act as state surrogates in providing it, much more is involved that
just a matter of public interest." Id. at 372 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Marshall recognized that the majority feared that elaborate pretermination hearings might be quite
expensive, and ultimately hurt consumers more than help them. See id. at 373 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"T'he solution to this problem... is to require only abbreviated pre-termination procedures for all utility
companies, not to free the 'private' companies to behave however they see fit." Id. What was most
troubling to Justice Marshall was that the Court's opinion would appear to apply to a broad range of the
company's claimed constitutional violations. See id. at 373-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Thus, the majority's analysis would seemingly apply as well to a company that refused to
extend services to Negroes, welfare recipients, or any other group that the company preferred,
for its own reasons, not to serve. I cannot believe that this Court would hold that the State's
involvement with the utility company was not sufficient to impose upon the company an
obligation to meet the constitutional mandate of nondiscrimination. Yet nothing in the
analysis of the majority opinion suggests otherwise.
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For example, where the Court held that a criminal defendant's state appointed
counsel's failure to file a timely application for discretionary review was not state
action, Justice Marshall reminded the Court in his dissenting opinion that in a
previous decision48 the Court held that a state criminal trial, initiated and conducted
by the state itself, constituted state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.49 Additionally, the Court held that a privately operated school, to
which maladjusted high school students were referred by city committees, was not
operating under color of state law so as to support a civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly discharging an employee. 0 In his dissent Justice
Marshall wrote: "The school receives almost all of its funds from the State, and
is heavily regulated. This nexus between the school and the State is so substantial
that the school's action must be considered state action."5
Once it was determined that state action was involved, Justice Marshall was
intent on holding the state to a high degree of due process fairness, as evidenced
in Board ofRegents v. Roth52 and Perry v. Sinderman,53 two cases decided the same
day. 4 In what should be recognized as one of the most piquant expressions of due
Id. at 374 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
A statute which seeks to redress economic disparity should, in Justice Marshall's opinion, receive
particularly favorable treatment under the Due Process Clauses. In New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin,
439 U.S. 96 (1978), Justice Marshall's concurring opinion states that "[iun view of the substantial
public interest at stake and the short lapse of time between notice and hearing, the Due Process Clause
does not dictate a contrary legislative decision." See id. at 112-13 (Marshall, J., concurring).
48. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980).
49. See Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 590 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
It is true that Cuyler v. Sullivan involved a challenge to the conduct of a private attorney
during the trial, while this case involves a challenge to the post-trial conduct of a private
attorney. However, post-trial proceedings are an integral part of the criminal process. In my
view, the State is just as much implicated in those proceedings as in the trial itself.
Id.
50. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 843.
51. Id. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall took pains to detail the "guidelines"
which the state issued. See id. at 845-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting). These "guidelines" covered "almost
every aspect of a private school's operations, including financial record keeping, student discipline,
medical examinations for students, parent involvement, health care, subjects of instruction, teacher-
student ratio, student records, confidentiality of records, transportation, insurance, nutrition, food
preparation, toileting procedures, physical facilities, and classroom equipment." See id. at 846
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall further opined that:
A contract with the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health, Drug Rehabilitation
Division, requires the school to provide counseling, educational and vocational services for
drug abusers. Under a contract with the city of Boston, the school must carry out the
educational plan devised by the Boston School Committee for each Boston student placed with
the school.
Id. at 846-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
53. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
54. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 564; Perry, 408 U.S. at 593. In Roth the Court held that an untenured
state-employed university professor was not deprived of liberty or property protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment when he was given no reason for the university's failure to renew his one-year contract.
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process law, Justice Marshall wrote: "It is not burdensome to give reasons when
reasons exist.""
4. Due Process Uses Equitable Remedies
Justice Marshall espoused the belief that equitable remedies may be used for
due process violations in certain circumstances.56
See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569. Justice Marshall wrote:
I would go further than the Court does in defining the terms "liberty" and "property."
... [lt is now firmly established that whether or not a private employer is free to act
capriciously or unreasonably with respect to employment practices, at least absent statutory
... or contractual... controls, a government employer is different. The government may only
act fairly and reasonably....
... [ilt is procedural due process that is our fundamental guarantee of fairness, our protection
against arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable government action.
Id. at 588-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
55. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 591 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall further stated:
Whenever an application for employment is denied, an employee is discharged, or a decision
not to rehire an employee is made, there should be some reason for the decision. It can
scarcely be argued that government would be crippled by a requirement that the reason be
communicated to the person most directly affected by the government's action.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Perry, Justice Marshall adopted his dissenting opinion in Roth. See
Perry, 408 U.S. at 605 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), Justice Marshall disagreed with the
Court's refusal to enjoin enforcement of the city's "chokehold policy." See id. at 113 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The Respondent had been stopped for a traffic violation and placed in a "chokehold." See
id. at 97. The majority held that the need for a "balance between state and federal authority counsels
restraint [against injunctive relief] in the absence of irreparable injury which is both great and
immediate." See id. at 112. Justice Marshall wrote:
Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges both past injury and a risk of future injury and presents a
concededly substantial claim that a defendant is implementing an unlawful policy, it will rarely
be easy to decide with any certainty at the outset of a lawsuit that no equitable relief would be
appropriate under any conceivable set of facts that he might establish in support of his claim.
Id. at 131 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Apart from the question of standing, the only remaining question
presented in the petition for certiorari is whether the preliminary injunction issued by the District Court
must be set aside because it 'constitute[s] a substantial interference in the operation of a municipal
police department."' Id. at 131-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Petition for Cert.) (alterations in
original).
Under the view expressed by the majority today, if the police adopt a policy of "shoot to kill,"
or a policy of shooting 1 out of 10 suspects, the federal courts will be powerless to enjoin its
continuation. The federal judicial power is now limited to levying a toll for such a systematic
constitutional violation.
Id. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
5. The Burden, Standard of Proof, and Presumptions
Justice Marshall also believed that the person complaining of a due process
violation bears the burden of proof57 which must be proved by a preponderance of
the evidence.58 Under certain circumstances Justice Marshall further believed that
a presumption of constitutionality applied and the person alleging a due process
violation had the burden of showing that the state acted in an "arbitrary and
irrational way."59
6. Absolute Requirements
Justice Marshall was an absolutist and demanded that certain requirements be
met in order to insure the fairness that due process demanded.
According to Justice Marshall, every litigant is entitled to a trial by a
competent and impartial tribunal.' Competency contemplates not only mental
acuity, but also jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person. Againfairness
57. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
58. See Herman v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 n.29 (1983).
59. In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway. Co., 470
U.S. 451 (1985), Justice Marshall stated that where a federal statute allegedly impairs a private contract,
there is a presumption in favor of the statute and the complaining party must establish that the
legislature has acted in an "'arbitrary and irrational way."' See id. at 472 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984)).
60. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 38 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (writing that a defendant has "'no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has
that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process' (quoting Berker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 (1972)). In Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), Justice
Marshall wrote that "[elvery criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by competent
jurors. This Court has long recognized that '[d]ue process implies a tribunal both impartial and mentally
competent to afford a hearing, a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence
before it."' Id. at 34 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). The
right to a tribunal extends to those governmental entities established to hear complaints. See SEC v.
Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742 (1984). Prior to Justice Marshall's ascent to the bench, the
Court required that due process assure afair trial. However, the parameters of that requirement were
not settled. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In Griffin, a five-four decision, the Court
held that an Illinois statute which denied effective appellate review to the poor, while granting it to all
others, was unconstitutional. See id. at 19-20. Four Justices- Chief Justice Warren, Justices Douglas
and Clark and the author of a plurality opinion, Justice Black-thought that the statute was
unconstitutional based on the Due Process Clause. See id. Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, based
his vote to condemn the statute on the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 20-21 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). The four dissenting Justices, while acknowledging the desirability of the state's furnishing
the indigent appellant with a transcript of testimony, did not see a constitutional requirement to do so.
See id. at 26-27. A few years later Justice Douglas, a true champion of due process, seemed to relegate
due process to an invidious discrimination ground, while measuring the fairness of procedures on equal
protection standards. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); see also Hilton v. Braunskill,
481 U.S. 770 (1987); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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figures preeminently in this calculus. In Shaffer v. Heitner,61 Justice Marshall
wrote that due process was denied when the state permitted a court to obtain
jurisdiction over a defendant by sequestering his property that happened to be
located in the state.62 Similarly, when a state law allowed for personal jurisdiction
via long-arm service over a non-resident defendant with virtually no contacts to the
state, Justice Marshall again held that such an exercise of jurisdiction violated the
Due Process Clause. 63 In order to be impartial, Justice Marshall stressed that the
61. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
62. In Shaffer, a stockholders'derivative suit, a Delaware court held that a disgruntled stockholder
was permitted to obtain jurisdiction over several corporate officials simply by sequestering shares of
their corporate stock-their only contact with the forum state. See id. at 189-95. Justice Marshall
authored the majority opinion, holding that this action violated due process. See id. at 216-17.
"[Jiudicial jurisdiction over a thing," is a "customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the
interests of persons in a thing." See id. at 207 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 56). Hence, in order to justify jurisdiction over the owner of the "thing," the plaintiff must
show that the owner has such contacts with the forum state so that the fairness test of International-
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), will be satisfied. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212. Justice
Marshall stressed the importance of the relationship among the defendant, the forum state and the
litigation. See id. at 204. This reflected a continued departure from Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877). Justice Marshall said that it was not wise to rely upon terms such as in personam and in rem
because their meaning varies from state to state. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 206. Justice Marshall made
it clear, however, that cases in which the "thing" is the subject of the litigation (a true in rem action),
the presence of the thing in the forum state would be sufficient to give the forum state jurisdiction. See
id. at 207-08. In cases such as Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), where the only importance of the
"thing" was to furnish a reason for the forum to assume jurisdiction (quasi-in-rem), the fairness test
must be applied by analyzing the contacts between the owner of the "thing" and the forum. See Shaffer,
433 U.S. at 209. Three years later, in Rush v. Savchuck, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), Justice Marshall
extended Shaffer, by holding that a state may not constitutionally exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
over a defendant by merely attaching the contractual obligation of the defendant contained in an
insurance policy. See id. at 328-33.
63. In Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), Justice Marshall wrote:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates as a limitation on the
jurisdiction of state courts to enter judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresident
defendants. It has long been the rule that a valid judgment imposing a personal obligation or
duty in favor of the plaintiff may be entered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant. The existence of personal jurisdiction, in turn, depends upon the presence
of reasonable notice to the defendant that an action has been brought, and a sufficient
connection between the defendant and the forum State to make it fair to require defense of the
action in the forum.
Id. at 91 (citations omitted). Then, turning to the case at hand, Justice Marshall made clear the nature
of the problem:
In this case, appellant does not dispute the adequacy of the notice that he received, but
contends that his connection with the State of California is too attenuated, under the standards
implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, to justify imposing upon him the
burden and inconvenience of defense in California.
tribunal must not have an erroneous or distorted presentation of the facts or the
law, and the tribunal must preserve both the appearance and reality of fairness.'
In addition to a competent and impartial tribunal, Justice Marshall required that the
litigants be entitled to a competent and impartial review of the initial determinations
made in their cases.65 Furthermore, those who cannot afford either tribunals of trial
or review must be furnished them.66 Notice was an important requirement of
Like any standard that requires a determination of "reasonableness," the "minimum
contacts" test of International Shoe is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the
facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite "affiliating
circumstances" are present. We recognize that this determination is one in which few answers
will be written "in black and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades
are innumerable."
Id. at 91-92 (citations omitted). Justice Marshall reiterated this position in dictum in Van
Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 526 (1988).
64. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980). Justice Marshall referred to the need for
courts to "generat[e] the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done."
See id. at 242 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951)).
65. See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 63 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting "[t]he
problem, as I see it, is to devise procedures that will permit reviewing courts to determine whether the
requirements of the Due Process Clause have been met."). In Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978),
the Court held that a juvenile, subjected to a hearing before a Master, who had no power to enter a final
order, was not placed in jeopardy a second time when the Juvenile Court judge who sentenced the
juvenile merely reviewed the Master's Report. See id. at 215. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Marshall wrote: "Maryland's scheme raises serious due process questions because the judge making
the final adjudication of guilt has not heard the evidence and may reverse the master's findings of
nondelinquency based on the judge's review of a cold record." Id. at 219 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), Justice Marshall took a similar position. See id. at 695
(Marshall, J., dissenting). In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), Justice Marshall dissented
because he thought that the Court had not sufficiently admonished the Florida Supreme Court against
merely applying a "rubber stamp" to lower court decisions. See id. at 370 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), Justice Marshall, in writing the majority opinion, held that
Florida's statute inflicting the death penalty upon an insane person was cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 416-17. Justice Marshall wrote separately (joined by
three other Justices), however, that the statute was also flawed in that it placed the appellate function
in the hands of the executive, rather than the judiciary, branch of government. See id. at 416. Justice
Marshall opposed the death penalty, which he described in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
as "irrevocable." See id. at 346 (Marshall, J., concurring). Though not explicitly expressed, Justice
Marshall might have further opposed the death penalty because it forever foreclosed any review of the
defendant's fate. See infra notes 103-08 and accompanying text; see also Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S.
770 (1987).
66. In United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), Justice Marshall dissented from the Court's
decision which denied bankruptcy proceedings for an indigent who could not afford the filing fee. See
id. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall said: "I find nothing in the majority's opinion
to convince me that due process is afforded a person who cannot receive a discharge in bankruptcy
because he is too poor. Even if only one person is affected by the filing fee, he is denied due process."
See id. at 460 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973), the Court
made the same ruling in connection with a state appellate court filing fee in an action to review the
determination of a state agency. See id. at 661. Justice Marshall dissented, writing: "It is at least very
doubtful that the Due Process Clause permits a State to shield an administrative agency from all judicial
review when that agency acts to revoke a benefit previously granted." See id. at 665 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that "[a]ppellants assert only that they must have some access to
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Justice Marshall's concept of due process fairness. Whether it entailed notice
furnished to an accused concerning a pending matter,67 notice of the disposition of
some court to contest the legality of administrative action adversely affecting them." Id. at 665 n.*
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). However, Justice Marshall felt "that [the] opportunity
was denied in this case, and important benefits were thereby taken from appellants without affording
them a chance to contest the legality of the taking in a court of law." See id. at 666 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). InAke v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion. He
stated the following:
This Court has long recognized that when a State brings its judicial power to bear on an
indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant has
a fair opportunity to present his defense. This elementary principle, grounded in significant
part on the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives
from the belief that justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a
defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in
which his liberty is at stake.
Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
67. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979). Justice Marshall noted that "[a] criminal
statute is... invalid if it 'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden."' See id. at 123 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)); see
also Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 107 (1979); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 75 (1984).
some property right,68 statutory notice,69or notice in a litigated matter,7 ° Justice
Marshall believed that the notice must be meaningful. For Justice Marshall,
meaningful notice was that which provided sufficient time for the recipient to
reasonably respond.71 Justice Marshall, however, allowed some balancing in the
matter of what notice was meaningful.7 2
Justice Marshall also believed that all parties have the right to a meaningful
hearing in a court of law.73 Accordingly, an accused has the right to confront and
68. See Mennonite Bd. v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791,798-99 (1986) (publishing notice of a property
sale in a place in which it was unlikely that all persons with a need to know would see it is a denial of
due process); Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 157-58 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Code of Federal Regulations rightly required such notice "that allows families to 'adjust household
budgets' according to changes in benefit levels.., and I fail to see how a notice that does not inform
recipients of their new benefit levels can serve this purpose." (citation omitted)).
69. See Hughley v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990). Justice Marshall said: "'Because
construction of a criminal statute must be guided by the need for fair warning, it is rare that legislative
history or statutory policies will support a construction of a statute broader than that clearly warranted
by the text."' See id. (quoting Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1990)). Justice Marshall
keenly studied legislative history to assure himself that judicial interpretation did not exceed legislative
intent. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 349 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall
wrote in his dissenting opinion:
It might be appropriate to import common-law defenses and immunities into the statute
if, in enacting § 1983, Congress had merely sought to federalize state tort law. But Congress
"intended to give a broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights." Different
considerations surely apply when a suit is based on a federally guaranteed right-in this case,
the constitutional right to due process of law-rather than the common law.
Id. (citations omitted). In Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), an immigration case, Justice
Marshall made it clear that the notice provided by the Immigration and Nationality Act was insufficient.
"To satisfy due process, notice must 'clarify what the charges are' in a manner adequate to apprise the
individuals of the basis for the government's proposed action .... Respondent was not given notice
sufficient to afford her a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that she was not excludible." Id. at 39
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
564 (1974)).
70. See Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985). Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, said
that "a court of appeals may adopt a rule conditioning appeal.., upon the filing of objections with the
district court identifying those issues on which further review is desired," so long as there is (1) "clear
notice to the litigants" and (2) "an opportunity to seek an extension of time for filing objections." See
id.
71. See Landon, 459 U.S. at 39. Justice Marshall explained that due process requires a party to
be adequately notified of the charges against them. See id. Furthermore, in Landon, the Respondent
was given insufficient notice as required by due process. See id.
The charges against Plasencia were also inadequately explained at the hearing itself. The
Immigration Judge did not explain to her that she would be entitled to remain in the country
if she could demonstrate that she had not agreed to receive compensation from the aliens
whom she had driven across the border. Nor did the judge inform respondent that the
meaningfulness of her departure was an issue at the hearing.
Id. at 39-40.
72. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
73. Justice Marshall followed the procedures outlined in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481
(1972). See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289,320-21 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall wrote:
As we have said in a somewhat different context "due process requires, at a minimum,
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cross examine witnesses testifying against him,74 and the right to present evidence
on his behalf.75
With regard to juries, a meaningful hearing required that the veniremen be
questioned about individual racial prejudices.76 Justice Marshall believed that such
inquiry goes to the very core of fairness.7 7 Furthermore, a jury should not be
that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle
their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful
opportunity to be heard." And surely the right to a "meaningful opportunity to be heard"
comprehends within it the right to be heard without unreasonable delay. This principle is
especially worthy of protection in the antitrust field where it is unmistakably clear that
Congress has given courts, rather than agencies, the primary duty to act.
Id. at 320-21 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971)). See Pernell v. Southall
Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 385 (1974). Justice Marshall wrote:
A landlord-tenant dispute, like any other lawsuit, cannot be resolved with due process of
law unless both parties have had a fair opportunity to present their cases. Our courts were
never intended to serve as rubber stamps for landlords seeking to evict their tenants, but rather
to see that justice be done before a man is evicted from his home.
Id.; see also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 211, 226 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 299 (1981).
74. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969), in which Justice Marshall stated: "We have
frequently emphasized that the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is a fundamental aspect
of procedural due process." Id. at 428.
75. In Jenkins, Justice Marshall wrote: "The right to present evidence is, of course, essential to
the fair hearing required by the Due Process Clause. And, . . .this right becomes particularly
fundamental when the proceeding allegedly results in a finding that a particular individual was guilty
of a crime." See id. at 429. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), Justice Marshall asked
rhetorically, "how often do we have to reiterate that the Due Process Clause 'recognizes higher values
than speed and efficiency?"' See id. at 582-83 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972)).
"We have held that '[i]n almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due
process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses."' Id. at 585 (quoting
Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254,269 (1970) (alteration in original)). "[T]he Court refuses to enforce
prisoners' fundamental procedural rights because of a legitimate concern for secrecy which must affect
only a tiny fraction of disciplinary cases. This is surely permitting the tail to wag the constitutional
dog." Id. at 587. "[T]he minimum due process procedural requirements of Morrissey v. Brewer are
applicable in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings." Id. at 593; see infra note 125 and
accompanying text.
76. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 599 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77. See id. In Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), Justice Marshall wrote:
"[O]ur common-law heritage, our Constitution, and our experience in applying that
Constitution have committed us irrevocably to the position that the criminal trial has one well-
defined purpose-to provide a reliable determination of guilt." That purpose simply cannot be
achieved if the jury's deliberations are tainted by bias or prejudice. Fairness and reliability are
assured only if the verdict is based on calm, reasoned evaluation of the evidence presented at
trial.
Id. at 225 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 505 (1965) (alteration in original)). In Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), Press-Enterprise petitioned for
the release of a transcript of voir dire proceedings and the vacatur of an order closing the voir dire
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mislead, either by closing arguments of counsel, 5or by jury instructions.79
Moreover, due process fairness demands that the prosecution divulge evidence
tending to establish the criminal defendant's innocence."0 Nor can the prosecution
offer evidence which unfairly portrays the defendant in a false light,"' or takes
proceedings. See id. at 503. The trial court and the California Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's
request. See id. at 504-05. The Supreme Court reversed the California Court of Appeals on the ground
that the English tradition of the openness of jury selection has carried over to this country and that
openness enhances both the basic fairness and the appearance of fairness so essential in the public
confidence in the criminal justice system. See id. at 505. Justice Marshall concurred with the result,
but wrote separately to posit that "the constitutional rights of the public and press to access to all aspects
of criminal trials are not diminished in cases in which 'deeply personal matters' are likely to be elicited
in voir dire proceedings." See id. at 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 511).
78. Delivering the opinion of the Court in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), Justice
Marshall found that where the prosecutor's closing argument in a criminal case leaves the jury with the
impression that its decision with respect to a death sentence will not be final because on appeal it may
be reversed, the trial lacks the fundamentalfairness required by the Due Process Clause. See id. at 340-
41. Five years after Caldwell, the Court decided Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990). In Sawyer,
Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death for a brutal murder. See id. at 230. Habeas corpus
relief was denied by the United States District Judge partly on the ground that the allegedly offending
prosecutorial remarks in the case differed from those in Caldwell, and his conviction became final
before that decision. See id. at 232. The defendant appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the
district court. See id. The Court said that Caldwell created a "new" rule of constitutional law, and
hence it could not be used by the petitioner in his habeas corpus hearing. See id. at 240-41. In his
dissent, Justice Marshall took pains to establish that the majority's belief that Caldwell established a
new rule of constitutional law was incorrect by carefully documenting the Court's error. See id. at 245
(Marshall, J., dissenting). In addition to his sound technical argument, Justice Marshall struck
forcefully at the unfairness of the Court's decision. See id. at 254-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The jury that sentenced Sawyer to death was deliberately misled about the significance
of its verdict. That Sawyer was thus denied a fundamentally fair trial was as apparent when
Sawyer's conviction became final as it is today. The Court's refusal to allow a federal habeas
court to correct this error is yet another indication that the Court is less concerned with
safeguarding constitutional rights than with speeding defendants, deserving or not, to the
executioner.
Id. at 259-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 387 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 801 (1972) (stating that "I believe that in failing to
disclose to petitioner certain evidence that might well have been of substantial assistance to the defense,
the State denied him a fair trial"); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 562 (1977) (noting that "the
integrity of the adversary system and the fairness of trials is undermined when the prosecution
surreptitiously acquires information concerning the defense strategy and evidence (or lack of it), the
defendant, or the defense counsel"). In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), Justice Marshall
also wrote:
When the state does not disclose information in its possession that might reasonably be
considered favorable to the defense, it precludes the trier of fact from gaining access to such
information and thereby undermines the reliability of the verdict. With a minimum of effort,
the state could improve the real and apparent fairness of the trial enormously, by assuring that
the defendant may place before the trier of fact favorable evidence known to the government.
Id. at 693 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 128-30 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall dissented from the Court's holding that by admitting into evidence (without objection) a
photograph of the defendant which was identified in a photo line-up by an undercover police officer
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advantage of its own misdeeds,82 or requires the defendant to incriminate himself.5 3
two or three days after a confrontation of short duration, due process was not violated. See id. "The
Due Process Clause requires adherence to the same high standard of fundamental fairness in dealing
with every criminal defendant, whatever his personal characteristics and irrespective of the strength of
the State's case against him." Id. at 128 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice Marshall explained,
"photos are static, two dimensional and often outdated," and "[w]ith little inconvenience, a corporeal
lineup including [the defendant] might have been arranged." See id. at 132-33 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
82. In United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), the Court held that evidence obtained by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) need not be suppressed despite the IRS violating its own rules
requiring approval of electronic surveillance, because the taxpayer violated other IRS regulations. See
id. at 473. This decision, Justice Marshall criticized in dissent, "must inevitably erode respect for law
among those charged with its administration." See id. at 757 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Citing
precedent, Justice Marshall said that:
[u]nderlying these decisions is a judgment, central to our concept of due process, that
government officials no less than private citizens are bound by rules of law. Where individual
interests are implicated, the Due Process Clause requires that an executive agency adhere to
the standards by which it professes its action to be judged.
Id. at 758 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice Marshall added that "although not always
expressly predicated on the Due Process Clause, these decisions are explicable in no other terms." Id.
at 758 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Marshall stated:
If prejudice becomes critical in measuring due process obligations, individual officials may
simply dispense with whatever procedures are unlikely to prove dispositive in a given case.
Thus the majority's analysis invites the very kind of capricious and unfettered decision making
that the Due Process Clause in general and these regulations in particular were designed to
prevent.
Id. at 764 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall further added that "when the Government engages
to protect individual interests, it may not constitutionally abrogate that commitment at its own
convenience." See id. at 765 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), the Court held that the Fifth Amendment (as
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment), was not violated by the use of pre-arrest
silence to impeach a criminal defendant's credibility. See id. at 240. Justice Marshall disagreed and
based his dissent on the conclusion that the defendant's due process rights were violated because of the
unfairness of the procedure. See id. at 249 (Marshall, J., dissenting). More specifically, Justice
Marshall explained that
in order for petitioner to offer his explanation of self-defense, he would necessarily have had
to admit that it was he who fatally stabbed the victim, thereby supplying against himself the
strongest possible proof of an essential element of criminal homicide. It is hard to imagine a
purer case of self-incrimination.
See id. at 247 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall opined that
since petitioner's failure to report and explain his actions prior to his arrest was not probative
of the falsity of his testimony at trial, it was fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due
process to allow the jury to draw from that silence an inference that his trial testimony was
false.
Id. at 249 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7. Balancing Requirements
Inherent in Justice Marshall's due process jurisprudence was a certain amount
of balancing of these elements.84 Justice Marshall did not definitively state a rule
as to the timing and the extent of such balancing, but from his opinions, one can
discern that Justice Marshall would only allow those who had the capacity to
achieve a symmetry of fairness to do the balancing.
For example, even though a criminal defendant is entitled to a speedy trial,
some delay in the conduct of the trial is permissible." The trial judge has a certain
amount of discretion involving the timing of the trial based on needs such as media
coverage,86 and courtroom security.87
A Notice-of-Alibi Rule requires criminal defendants intending to rely upon an
alibi to furnish the prosecution with the names and address of witnesses who they
intend to call in support of their alibi.88 Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall
placed a proviso on the constitutionality of this rule by requiring that reciprocal
84. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), Justice Marshall stated that "there is much
flexibility in the due process requirement." See id. at 584 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
85. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 796 (1977). "We... hold that to prosecute a
defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him of due process, even if his defense might
have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time." Id. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court,
reconciled the Lovasco holding with the Court's prior stance in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,
324-25 (1971), which established that proof of actual prejudice resulting from pre-indictment delay
merely makes a due process claim concrete and ripe for adjudication. See Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 324-25.
Justice Marshall clarified that "[t]he due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well
as the prejudice to the accused." See id. at 790.
86. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800 (1975).
The constitutional standard of fairness requires that a defendant have "a panel of
impartial, 'indifferent,' jurors." Qualified jurors need not, however, be totally ignorant of the
facts and issues involved. "To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to
the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of
a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard."
Id. (citations omitted). 'The length to which the trial court must go in order to select jurors who appear
to be impartial is another factor relevant in evaluating those jurors' assurances of impartiality." Id. at
802-03. Justice Marshall pointed out that in prior cases the Supreme Court overturned state court
convictions obtained in a trial atmosphere that had been utterly corrupted by press coverage. See
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,351-52 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,542-43 (1965); Irvin
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961). Those cases, however, Justice Marshall cautioned, "cannot be
made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure to information about a state defendant's prior
convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he is charged alone presumptively deprives
the defendant of due process." See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799.
87. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570 (1986). Writing for the Court in Holbrook, Justice
Marshall found the presence of four armed state troopers sitting in the first row of the spectators' section
of the court-room did not violate that constitutional right of the six defendants in a criminal trial. See
id.; see also Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 339 (1985) (stating that if the trial judge is
permitted to correct an error a due process violation might be alleviated).
88. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1970) (establishing the constitutionality of the
alibi rule).
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rights be given to criminal defendants. 9 A balancing of rights between the accused
and the accuser determines the extent of discovery allowed 9° Furthermore, Justice
Marshall indicated that an unrealistic statutory interpretation will not be tolerated.9'
Justice Marshall authored an opinion of the Court which held that the
fundamental fairness of the Due Process Clause did not require law enforcement
agencies to preserve breath samples in order to introduce the results of breath-
analysis tests into evidence.92 Fairness was preserved in this case because no
evidentiary advantage was gained by either the prosecution or the defense. 93
The composition of certain absolute requirements of due process, such as
89. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973).
"The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which
players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played. We find ample room
in that system, at least as far as 'due process' is concerned, for [a rule] which is designed to
enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State
ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or
innocence."
Id. (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 82).
90. See id. "Although the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery
which the parties must be afforded, it does speak to the balance of forces between the accused and his
accuser." Id. (citations omitted). Justice Marshall stated:
[1]n the absence of a strong showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two-
way street. The State may not insist that trials be run as a "search for truth" so far as defense
witnesses are concerned, while maintaining "poker game" secrecy for its own witnesses. It is
fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the
same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of
evidence which he disclosed to the State.
Id. at 475-76.
91. See id. at 479.
[T]he State cannot constitutionally force compliance with its scheme on the basis of a totally
unsubstantiated possibility that the statute might be read in a manner contrary to its plain
language. Thus, in the absence of fair notice that he would have an opportunity to discover
the State's rebuttal witnesses, petitioner cannot be compelled to reveal his alibi defense.
Id. at 478-79. In a footnote, Justice Marshall stated that "merely informing the defendant of the time
and place of the crime does not approach the sort of reciprocity which due process demands." Id. at
479 n.12.
92. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984).
93. See id. Justice Marshall wrote:
Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be
limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense.
To meet this standard of constitutional materiality . . . evidence must both possess an
exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature
that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably
available means. Neither of these conditions is met on the facts of this case.
Id.
notice94 and personal jurisdiction,95 by their very nature require a certain balancing.
With regard to notice, the objective must be balanced against the limitations of
statutory language.96 Jurisdiction, vel non, must involve a balancing of "various
interests and policies," including the defendant's forum-related activities.97
Justice Marshall believed that governmental interests must be balanced against
individual deprivation;9" but the government interest must be "very important.""
94. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
95. See supra text accompanying note 60-66.
96. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), Justice Marshall stated that "[i]t is a
basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly
defined." See id. at 108. He added, however, that, "[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never
expect mathematical certainty from our language." See id. at 110; Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). Justice Marshall wrote:
The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates-as well as the relative importance of
fair notice and fair enforcement-depends in part on the nature of the enactment. Thus,
economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often
more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior
carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action. Indeed, the
regulated enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own
inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process. The Court has also expressed greater
tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of
imprecision are qualitatively less severe. And the Court has recognized that a scienter
requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice
to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed.
Id. (citations omitted).
97. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 317 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). World-Wide Volkswagen might appear to be an extension of Kulko. See supra note 63 and
accompanying text. The Court held that the Due Process Clause prohibits a state court from exercising
personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations which sold and distributed a vehicle out-of-state, when
the vehicle was involved in an accident in the forum state. See id. at 295-99. Justice Marshall
dissented because he believed that the majority's reliance on Kulko was misplaced; it did not sufficiently
analyze the defendants' forum related activities. See id. at 313-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall called for a balancing of "various interests and policies." See id. at 317 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
98. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the Court held that the practice of "double bunking"
(placing inmates together in facilities that were designed for half their number), pre-trial detainees, as
well as other restrictive practices, did not violate the Due Process Clause when such treatment is
"rationally related" to some non-punitive purpose. See id. at 538-40. In dissent, Justice Marshall wrote
that "as with other due process challenges, the inquiry should be whether the governmental interests
served by any given restriction outweigh the individual deprivation suffered." Id. at 564 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). "To make detention officials' intent the critical factor in assessing the constitutionality of
impositions on detainees is unrealistic in the extreme." Id. at 565 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "By its
terms, the Due Process Clause focuses on the nature of deprivations, not on the persons inflicting them."
Id. at 567 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall called for a balancing test. See id. at 569-70
(Marshall, J., dissenting). In Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984), the Court held that detainees
are not deprived of due process where they are denied contactwith spouses, relatives and friends and
are subjected to random "shake-down" searches in their absence, when the purpose is not punishment,
but is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective per Wolfish. See id. at 586, 589-91.
In dissent, Justice Marshall said that this is the "fourth time in recent years that the Court has turned
a deaf ear on inmates' claims." See id. at 596 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 408 U.S. 517 (1984). Justice Marshall thought the outcome
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While Justice Marshall did not believe that prisoners were entitled to be informed
of the authorities' reasons for denying a request to present witnesses, he believed
that a contemporaneous explanation should be prepared and made available to the
judge through an "in camera" inspection." Such an arrangement would strike a
balance, in Justice Marshall's view, between the important government interest and
individual deprivation.
B. The Three Interests Protected: Life, Liberty, and Property
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protects
individual life, liberty, and property interests. Justice Marshall said that:
[o]ne of the purposes of the Due Process Clause is to reduce the incidence of error
in deprivations of life, liberty or property. One of the ways such error can be
reduced, in turn, is by allowing persons whose interests may be affected adversely
of Block was worse than the outcome in Wolfish. See Block, 468 U.S. at 598 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[A] desire to run a jail as cheaply as possible is not a legitimate reason for abridging the
constitutional rights of its occupants ....
[N]either petitioners nor the majority have shown that permitting low-risk pretrial
detainees who have been incarcerated for more than a month occasionally to have contact
visits with their spouses and children would frustrate the achievement of any substantial state
interest. Because such visitation would significantly alleviate the adverse impact of the jail's
current policies upon respondents' familial rights, its deprivation violates the Due Process
Clause.
Id. at 604 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
99. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253. 289 (1984). The Scholl Court held that § 320.5(3)(b) of
the New York Family Court Act did not violate the Due Process Clause even though it authorizes
pretrial detention of accused juvenile delinquents based on a finding that there is a "serious risk" that
the juvenile "may before the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult would constitute
a crime." See id. at 255. While acknowledging that the Due Process Clause is applicable to juvenile
proceedings, the Court based its holding on the doctrine that certain legitimate government objectives
are sufficiently important to justify an abridgement of the detainee's liberty interests and that the
provision incorporates procedural safeguards sufficient to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary impairment
of constitutionally protected rights. See id. at 263,267-68,277. In his dissent, Justice Marshall opined
that "[iut is manifest that § 320.5(3)(b) impinges upon fundamental rights. If the 'liberty' protected by
the Due Process Clause means anything, it means freedom from physical restraint. Only a very
important government interest can justify deprivation of liberty in this basic sense." Id. at 288
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 251-54 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that while a prisoner has no due process right to be incarcerated in a
particular prison, or part thereof, transferring him from a prison close to his family and friends to one
a great distance away, violates his due process rights); infra notes 109-48 and accompanying text
concerning protected liberty interests; see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989).
100. See Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 508 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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by government decisions to participate in those decisions.'
Justice Marshall further stated that "[i]t is a fundamental tenet of due process that
'[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes.'" 0 2
1. Life
As expressed in his concurrence in Furman v. Georgia"°3 and his dissent in
Gregg v. Georgia,'" Justice Marshall believed that the death penalty was excessive
and constituted cruel and unusual penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
However, Justice Marshall saw a considerable amount of due process in the Eighth
Amendment, °5 but described the death penalty as "irrevocable"'" and reminded
us of the tragedy of being unable to correct a wrong after an innocent person is
executed. 7 Justice Marshall spoke again in terms of fairness.1' It is not a rash
conclusion to believe that there was a certain amount of due process jurisprudence
in Justice Marshall's opposition to the death penalty.
101. Block, 468 U.S. at 605 (citation omitted) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253 (1984), Justice Marshall phrased the same sentiment as follows: "One of the purposes of
imposing procedural constraints on decisions affecting life, liberty, or property is to reduce the
incidence of error." See id. at 303-04.
102. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979) (quoting Lanzata v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451, 453 (1939)).
103. 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. 428 U.S. 227, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. See infra notes 341-45 and accompanying text.
106. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 346 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. See id. at 367-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated:
No matter how careful courts are, the possibility of perjured testimony, mistaken honest
testimony, and human error remain all too real. We have no way of judging how many
innocent persons have been executed[,] but we can be certain that there were some. Whether
there were many is an open question made difficult by the loss of those who were most
knowledgeable about the crime for which they were convicted. Surely there will be more as
long as capital punishment remains part of our penal law.
Id.
108. See id. at 371 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
At a time in our history when the streets of the Nation's cities inspire fear and despair,
rather than pride and hope, it is difficult to maintain objectivity and concern for our fellow
citizens. But, the measure of a country's greatness is its ability to retain compassion in time
of crisis. No nation in the recorded history of man has a greater tradition of revering justice
and fair treatment for all its citizens in times of turmoil, confusion, and tension than ours. This
is a country which stands tallest in troubled times, a country that clings to fundamental
principles, cherishes its constitutional heritage, and rejects simple solutions that compromise
the values that lie at the roots of our democratic system.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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2. Liberty
The "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause encompasses a variety of
individual rights. When Justice Marshall ascended to the Court in 1967, "liberty,"
as protected by the Due Process Clauses, had not been clearly defined." Because
the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states, the liberty of not testifying against
one's self had to be furnished through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'10 The matter which received the most attention under the guise of
a protected liberty interest was the freedom to contract. "' Lochner v. New York" 2
had a chilling effect on state legislatures attempting to effect welfare legislation for
almost thirty years. However, Lochner's influence over the freedom to contract
could not last. "3 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, ' while not overruling Lochner,
abandoned its underpinnings" 5 and removed all due process prohibitions against
109. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923) (finding that a state statute which
prohibited the teaching of any language other than English to any child who successfully passed the
Eighth Grade was unconstitutional). Justice McReynolds opined:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed,
the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely
stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399. Perhaps Justice McReynolds' explanation of "liberty" was an expansion of Justice Harlan's
description 19 years earlier, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904), where he said that
"[t]he liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment... consists, in part, in the right of a person 'to live
and work where he will."' See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29 (quoting Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578,
589 (1897)).
110. See Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372, 380 (1905).
111. One school of thought posits that the right to contract freely fits more comfortably under the
"property" component of the Due Process Clause than it does under the "liberty" component. See
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17-21 (1915).
112. 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) (declaring a New York statute setting the maximum number of hours
bakers could work unconstitutional).
113. Lochner itself carried the seeds of its own destruction; four Justices dissented in that case,
including Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes, whose dissent carried the famous words: "The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
114. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (determining that a Washington state minimum wage law for women was
valid).
115. See id. at 391. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, writing for the Court said:
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits
the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the
Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its
phases has its history and connotation. Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily
economic and social welfare statutes and regulations." 6
Justice Marshall made it clear that his concept of "liberty" was not restricted
to the right to contract." 7 According to Justice Marshall, "the concept of liberty
under the Due Process Clause includes 'the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life... and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.'11
8
Justice Marshall's first opportunity as a Justice to express himself on the
subject" 9 involved a case in which the national Selective Service Board affirmed
subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its
subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.
Id. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court struck down a state statute which sterilized
habitual criminals and denied their right to procreate. See id. at 536-38. However, the Court struck
down the statute on equal protection grounds rather than due process. See id. at 538. The only
reference to due process came from Chief Justice Stone, who, in his concurring opinion, stated his belief
that its absence from consideration constituted the legislation's real flaw. See id. at 542 (Stone, J.,
concurring).
116. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PoLCtES 487-94 (1997).
117. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432,461 (1985). In Cleburne, an
equal protection case, Justice Marshall said: "The right to 'establish a home' has long been cherished
as one of the fundamental liberties embraced by the Due Process Clause." Id. (quoting Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), Justice Marshall
cited the ex post facto invalidity, U.S. CONSTITUTION Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, as the reason for the decision,
rather than the equally applicable violation of a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 25. Justice Marshall did not always limit his liberty analysis to
discussions of due process. For example, in Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991), Justice
Marshall wrote: "Because of the severe impact of criminal laws on individual liberty, I believe that an
opportunity to challenge a delegated lawmaker's compliance with congressional directives is a
constitutional necessity when administrative standards are enforced by criminal law." See id. at 170
(Marshall, J., concurring). He referred to due process specifically at the end of his concurring opinion.
See id. at 170-71 (Marshall, J., concurring). In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S.
208 (1986), a case dealing with the First Amendment, Justice Marshall wrote that "[i]t is beyond debate
that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect
of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
freedom of speech." See id. at 214 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). In
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986), Justice Marshall joined Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion which held that when a prisoner was injured due to the negligence of prison officials in
protecting him from other violent prisoners he was deprived of liberty without due process of law. See
id. at 349-60. In Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980), Justice Marshall recognized that expatriation
proceedings threaten one's liberty. See id. at 271-72.
118. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 241 n.4 (1991) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
546, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))); see also Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 211 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that a discharge from employment amounts
to a deprivation of liberty).
119. While in the Second Circuit, Justice Marshall authored United States v. Mason, 344 F.2d 673
(2nd Cir. 1965). The decision overturned the incarceration of a Spanish seaman by the U.S. Navy and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service's attempt to cooperate with the Spanish Navy pursuant to
a Treaty between Spain and the United States. See id. at 673. Justice Marshall wrote: "We have not
been unmindful of the legitimate diplomatic and strategic interests served by the Treaty. However,
these interests can only be satisfied within the limits of our constitutional scheme, which requires that
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a local board's "I-A" classification of a conscientious objector, with no reasons
given."' The Court affirmed the Second Circuit, which ruled against the objector
on statutory grounds. 2' Though the plaintiff alleged a violation of due process, the
Court did not refer to these constitutional grounds in its decision. However, Justice
Marshall, in his dissent, stated that "where... the underlying procedures of the
classification system are ... challenged[,] . . .pre-induction review should be
permitted;" for without it an inductee's liberty is taken without a competent tribunal
deciding constitutional issues.'22 Though not requiring a definite time limit, the
"'nature and duration of commitment [must] bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed"' in order to comply with due
process of law.'23
Justice Marshall wrote that "[p]risoners do not shed their basic constitutional
rights at the prison gate, but instead retain a residuum of constitutionally protected
liberty independent of any state laws or regulations"' 24 and that the "freedom from
imposition of serious discipline is a 'liberty' entitled to due process protection. ' 125
all governmental action resulting in the deprivation of a person's liberty be authorized by law." Id. at
685.
120. See Fein v. Selective Serv. Sys., 405 U.S. 365, 366-78 (1972).
121. See id.
122. Id. at 392-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting). -
123. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 250 (1972) (quoting Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)) (emphasis added). In McNeil, the Petitioner was convicted of two assaults
and sentenced to five years imprisonment. See id. at 245. Instead of committing him to prison, the
sentencing court, exparte, referred him to the Institution for an indeterminate term under Maryland's
Defective Delinquency Law to determine whether he needed psychiatric treatment before returning to
society. See id. The Petitioner had remained in the Institution a year past his term of imprisonment.
See id. Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall stated that the Petitioner's due process rights were
violated. See id. at 246. Justice Marshall added: "In this case it is sufficient to note that the petitioner
has been confined for six years, and there is no basis for anticipating that he will ever be easier to
examine than he is today." Id. at 250. "[I]f confinement is to rest on a theory of civil contempt, then
due process requires a hearing to determine whether petitioner has in fact behaved in a manner that
amounts to contempt." Id. at 251.
124. Kentucky Dep't. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 466 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
125. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 581 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In Wolff, Justice Marshall uttered the same famous lines that prisoners do not shed
their constitutional rights at the prison gate. See id. Justice Marshall was referring to the Court's
rulings: (1) a prison "[c]omplex may not prohibit inmates from assisting one another in the preparation
of legal documents unless it provides adequate alternative legal assistance"; (2) "inspection of mail from
attorneys for contraband"; (3) "advance written notice of the charges against them and a statement of
the evidence relied on, the facts found, and the reasons supporting a disciplinary board's decision", and
(4) a hearing and an opportunity to speak in his own defense. See id. at 580-81 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall dissented from part of the Court's opinion because prisoners were not
given the right to call, confront, or cross examine witnesses, nor could they present documentary
evidence. See id. at 580-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
To my mind, the right in one's personal appearance is inextricably bound up with
the historically recognized right of "every individual to the possession and control
of his own person"... and, perhaps even more fundamentally, with "the right to be
let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. 126
Moreover, according to Justice Marshall, "all prisoners potentially eligible for
parole have a liberty interest of which they may not be deprived without due
process, regardless of the particular statutory language that implements the parole
system."' 27 In further support of prisoner's rights, Justice Marshall found that a
prisoner transferred to a prison a great distance from his family and friends,
violates the prisoner's due process rights.
21
126. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238,253 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Union Pac.
R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). In Kelley, the Court held that a county regulation limiting
policemen's hair length did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 238. Justice Marshall
accepted the aims of "identifiability" and maintenance of esprit de corps, asserted by the county, but
he could find no relationship between the regulation and those goals. See id. at 254 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). "To say that the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not encompass
matters of personal appearance would be fundamentally inconsistent with the value of privacy, self-
identity, autonomy, and personal integrity that I have always assumed the Constitution was designed
to protect." Id. at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 22 (1979)
(emphasis added). I
It is self-evident that all individuals possess a liberty interest in being free from physical
restraint. Upon conviction for a crime, of course, an individual may be deprived of this liberty
to the extent authorized by penal statutes. But when a State enacts a parole system, and creates
the possibility of release from incarceration upon satisfaction of certain conditions, it
necessarily qualifies that initial deprivation. In my judgment, it is the existence of this system
which allows prison inmates to retain their protected interest in securing freedoms available
outside prison. Because parole release proceedings clearly implicate this retained liberty
interest, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that due process be observed, irrespective of the
specific provisions in the applicable parole statute.
Id. at 23. Justice Marshall noted that Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) held that "individuals on probation also retain a liberty interest which
cannot be terminated without due process of law." See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 24. From a
constitutional perspective, Justice Marshall saw no difference between the liberty one possesses and the
liberty one desires. Id. at 26. The actual holding of Morrissey was that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment required that a state afford an individual an informed hearing before revoking
his parole. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480-82. Justice Marshall voted with the majority in Morrissey
without writing an opinion (but still joined Justice Brennan's concurrence). See id. at 471. In Gagnon,
the Court held that a person on probation is entitled to a hearing when his probation is revoked, but the
Court did not address the issue of whether a person on probation is entitled to appointed counsel. See
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 781-82. In Gagnon, Justice Marshall again sided with the majority. See id. at
778.
128. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 251-53 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall wrote:
An inmate's liberty interest is not limited to whatever a State chooses to bestow upon
him. An inmate retains a significant residuum of constitutionally protected liberty following
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For Justice Marshall, juveniles in detention were afforded the same liberty as
adults and the fact that they were always in "some form of custody" did not make
their liberty interest any less precious.'29
The right to privacy is not specifically mentioned in the United States
Constitution, but over the years, the Court has generally agreed that there is a
constitutionally protected right to privacy.13 However, there has never been
his incarceration independent of any state law.
There can be little doubt that the transfer of Wakinekona from a Hawaii prison to a prison
in California represents a substantial qualitative change in the conditions of his confinement.
In addition to being incarcerated, which is the ordinary consequence of a criminal conviction
and sentence, Wakinekona has in effect been banished from his home, a punishment
historically considered to be "among the severest." For an indeterminate period of time,
possibly the rest of his life, nearly 2,500 miles of ocean will separate him from his family and
friends. As a practical matter, Wakinekona may be entirely cut off from his only contacts with
the outside world, just as if he had been imprisoned in an institution which prohibited visits
by outsiders. Surely the isolation imposed on him by the transfer is far more drastic than that
which normally accompanies imprisonment.
Id. (citations omitted). Justice Marshall recognized the importance of prisoners' contact with the
outside world. In Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989), Justice
Marshall wrote: "Prison visits have long been recognized as critically important to inmates as well as
to the communities to which the inmates ultimately will return." See id. at 468 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
129. In Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), the majority upheld a statute as constitutional
because its purpose was to detain juveniles who might commit a crime if released. See id. at 253. The
fact that the statute also allowed for the detention ofjuveniles who would not have committed a crime
if released did not affect the statute's constitutionality. See id. at 281. This was the antithesis of Justice
Marshall's concept of due process. In dissent, Justice Marshall wrote:
The curtailment of liberty consequent upon detention of a juvenile, the majority contends, is
mitigated by the fact that "juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody." In
any event, the majority argues, the conditions of confinement associated with "secure
detention" under [the applicable state statute] are not unduly burdensome. These contentions
enable the majority to suggest that [the statute] need only advance a "legitimate state
objective" to satisfy the strictures of the Due Process Clause.
The majority's arguments do not survive scrutiny. Its characterization of preventive
detention as merely a transfer of custody from a parent or guardian to the State is difficult to
take seriously. Surely there is a qualitative difference between imprisonment and the condition
of being subject to the supervision and control of an adult who has one's best interests at heart.
Id. at 289-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Marshall continued: "Indeed, the
impressionability of juveniles may make the experience of incarceration more injurious to them than
to adults; all too quickly juveniles subjected to preventive detention come to see society at large as
hostile and oppressive and to regard themselves as irremediably 'delinquent."' Id. at 291 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice Marshall categorized this as a serious injury to presumptively
innocent persons-encompassing the curtailment of their constitutional rights to liberty-and he totally
rejected the majority's suggested ad hoc determination of constitutionality. See id. at 308 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
130. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508-10 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
unanimity as to what constitutional provision guarantees the right to privacy. 3'
Justice Marshall's first opportunity to expressly address the right to privacy
came eleven years after joining the Court.'32 In Zablocki v. Redhail,' the Court
was presented with a state statute which forbid marriages by individuals owing
back child support unless a court order was entered granting permission.' The
state would not grant permission unless proof of compliance with child support
obligations was established.'35 Perhaps overstating precedent set forth in Griswold
v. Connecticut,136 Justice Marshall found a recognized right to marry included in
the "right of privacy," which was implicit in the liberty provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.'37 Thus, the statute was deemed unconstitu-
tional because it violated the Due Process clause.'38
In another privacy decision, the Court found that a state statute requiring a
physician to notify, if possible, the parents of a dependent, unmarried, minor girl
prior to performing an abortion on her violated no constitutional guarantee.1"9
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, said the decision was narrow because it merely
found "shortcomings in appellant's complaint and therefore denie[d] relief."'140
Justice Marshall took the opportunity, however, to express his personal views
131. Justice William 0. Douglas, writing for the majority in Griswold, found the basis in a
"penumbra" of the Bill of Rights. See id. at 484-85. The concurring Justices found this constitutional
right in different parts of the Constitution. See id. at 486-507. Justice Goldberg (joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Brennan) found the constitutional right in the Ninth Amendment. See id.
at 486 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan found the constitutional right protected by the "liberty"
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1932)). In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Justice
Blackmun, writing the majority opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, found the right in the Fourteenth
Amendment's "liberty" provision. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. Thirteen years after Roe, Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, reiterated that position in his dissent in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Conversely, the majority
in Bowers held that the right of privacy does not include the right for consenting adults to engage in
homosexual acts in the privacy of their homes. See id. at 195-96. Justice Powell, concurring in
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), found the basis for the privacy guarantee in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process provisions. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 400 (Powell,
J., concurring).
132. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 375.
135. See id.
136. 381 U.S. 479.
137. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384. In the same opinion, Justice Marshall observed that the Court
in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), "recognized that freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 385 (quoting LaFleur, 414
U.S. at 639-40).
138. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 382-87.
139. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981).
140. See id. at 425 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court determined that the plaintiff lacked
standing to challenge the "overbreadth" of the state statute. See id. at 406.
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regarding the right to privacy. 4' According to Justice Marshall, the Court had
established precedent that a pregnant woman possesses a "fundamental right to
choose whether to obtain an abortion or carry the pregnancy to term."'
Her.choice, like the deeply intimate decisions to marry, to procreate, and to use
contraceptives, is guarded from unwarranted state intervention by the right to
privacy. Grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
right to privacy protects both the woman's "interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions" and her "individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters."' 43
Justice Marshall recognized that the Supreme Court had adhered to the concept of
a strong family bond, and hence it may seem incongruent to examine "burdens"
imposed by a statute which requires notice to a minor's parent when she is in
trouble.'44
In Connell v. Higginbotham,45 Florida imposed a loyalty oath as a prerequisite
141. See id. at 434-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 434 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)) (footnotes
omitted); Doe v. Bloton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). In both Roe and Bolton, Justice Marshall joined with
the majority but did not write a separate opinion.
143. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 434 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599-600 (1977)). The right has often been termed the "right to be let alone." See id. at 435 n.18
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
The privacy right does not necessarily guarantee that "every minor, regardless of age or
maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy." Utah, however assigns
this consent authority to a woman of any age who seeks pregnancy-related medical care. This
appeal does not present the broad issue of when may a State require parental consent for a
surgical procedure on a minor child. At issue here is only the scope of the minor's
constitutional privacy ight in the face of a statutory parental notice requirement.
Id. at 435-36 n. 19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
144. See id. at 437 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall pointed out that "[r]ealistically,
however, many families do not conform to this ideal." See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). He also wrote
that "[t]he absolute nature of the statutory requirement, with exception permitted only if the parents are
physically unavailable, violates the requirement that regulations in this fundamentally personal area be
carefully tailored to serve a significant state interest." Id. at 446 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall further stated:
I have no doubt that the challenged statute infringes upon the constitutional right to privacy
attached to a minor woman's decision to complete or terminate her pregnancy .... Rather
than respecting the private realm of family life, the statute invokes the criminal justice
machinery of the State in an attempt to influence the interactions within the family.
Id. at 454 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
145. 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
to employment by the State.'46 The Court held the oath requirement unconstitu-
tional, because it "falls within the ambit of decisions of this Court proscribing
summary dismissal from public employment without hearing or inquiry required
by due process."'47 Justice Marshall concurred "plainly and simply on the ground
that belief as such cannot be the predicate of governmental action."'48
3. Property
Early on, the Court took a narrow view of "property" under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1"' Prior to Justice Marshall ascending to the Court, the Court's view
of property had not changed. 5° Justice Marshall attempted to influence the Court
to broaden the meaning of property in order to extend the application of due
process of law. 5' He wrote six opinions dealing with the impact of the Due
Process Clauses on property' and property owners. 5 3
146. See id. The oath stated: "I do not believe in the overthrow of the Government of the United
States or of the State of Florida by force or violence." See id. at 208.
147. See id. at 208 (citing Slochwer v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956)).
148. Id. at 210 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Due process may rightly be invoked to condemn
Florida's mechanistic approach to the question of proof." Id. at 209. He quoted from Justice Robert
H. Jackson: "'If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion."' Id. at 209-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
149. In Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877), a complaint was made regarding the
assessment of real property by the city of New Orleans for improving its drainage. See id. at 97-98.
The Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment did not contain the Fifth Amendment's provision for
just compensation, and therefore ruled that so long as the procedural aspect of collecting the tax was
complied with "the judgment in such proceedings cannot be said to deprive the owner of his property
without due process of law, however obnoxious it may be to other objections." See id. at 105.
150.
(D]own to the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not supposed that
statutes regulating the use, or even the price of the use, of private property necessarily deprived
an owner of his property without due process of law... . The amendment does not change
the law in this particular: it simply prevents the States from doing that which will operate as
such a deprivation.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 533 (1934). In Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), the
Court held that the expectation of receiving social security payments is not a property right. See id. at
610.
151. In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), Justice Marshall said that an employee has a
property interest in his chain of entitlement to continued employment. See id. at 211 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). On the other hand, Justice Marshall has also viewed the right to discharge an employee a
property interest. See Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1987).
152. In FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987), Justice Marshall, writing for the
majority, noted that there must be a taking of property in order for there to be a constitutional violation
under the Due Process Clause. See id. at 253.
153. Justice Marshall authored three Supreme Court opinions, National Railroad Passenger Corp.
v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 470 U.S. 451 (1985) (writing for the court), United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (same), and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (same), and three concurring opinions, Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v.
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Among these property decisions was Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins 54
in which Justice Marshall concurred in upholding a city ordinance which prohibited
the owner of the shopping center from preventing solicitors from gathering
signatures. 5 5 In his concurrence, Justice Marshall pointed out that in a prior
decision, Martinez v. California,'56 the Court held that even a pre-existing state law
remedy, which may affect property protected by the Due Process Clause, could be
changed to conform to a State's interests in fashioning its own rule of law.'57 Of
course, an exception to this rule exists where that state interest is wholly arbitrary
or irrational.'
Rights of property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken
away without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed
at the will . . . of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations.
Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they
are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances.159
In another case, the Court also held that a prisoner whose mail order hobby kit
was lost through the negligence of prison officials, had been deprived of his
Robins, 477 U.S. 74 (1980) (concurring), Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
533 (1985) (same), and Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
154. 447 U.S. 74.
155. See id. at 77 (Marshall, J., concurring).
156. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
157. See id. at 281-82.
158. See Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 92.
159. Id. at 92-93 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1887)).
Justice Marshall further noted:
Appellants' claim in this case amounts to no less than a suggestion that the common law of
trespass is not subject to revision by the State, notwithstanding the California Supreme Court's
finding that state-created rights of expressive activity would be severely hindered if shopping
centers were closed to expressive activities by members of the public. If accepted, that claim
would represent a return to the era of Lochner v. New York, when common-law rights were
also found immune from revision by State or Federal Government. Such an approach would
freeze the common law as it has been constructed by the courts, perhaps at its 19th- century
state of development. It would allow no room for change in response to changes in
circumstance. The Due Process Clause does not require such a result.
Id. at 93 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Marshall further stated: "Ihere has been
no showing of interference with appellants' normal business operations. The California court has not
permitted an invasion of any personal sanctuary .... No rights of privacy are implicated. In these
circumstances there is no basis for strictly scrutinizing the intrusion authorized by the California
Supreme Court." Id. at 94-95 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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property right under color of state law."6 Justice Marshall concurred with the
Court's finding that an available post-deprivation cause of action for damages
under state law for negligent deprivation of property without due process of law
"may preclude a finding of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."'' Justice
Marshall, however, disagreed with the majority's conclusion that an adequate state-
law remedy existed.'62 Justice Marshall pointed out that the claimant was a state
prisoner whose access to information about his legal rights was necessarily limited
by his confinement, and there was no proof that he was ever informed about those
rights.'63 In this case the prisoner pursued his claim through the prison's grievance
procedure, which, in Justice Marshall's eyes, failed to provide requisite due process
of law. "
A case which yielded a similar holding involved the Surface Mining and
Control Act. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,65
the Court was confronted with the constitutionality of this Act which instructed the
Secretary of the Interior to immediately order partial or total cessation of surface
mining operations if a federal inspection determined that the operation violated the
Act or a permit condition required by the Act, so that the operation "creates an
immediate danger to the health or safety of the public, or is causing, or can
reasonably be expected to cause significant, imminent environmental harm to land,
air, or water resources .... ."" Justice Marshall writing for the Court, held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not violated by the Act.' 67 The
Court noted that while due process ordinarily requires "'some kind of hearing'
prior to deprivation,"'8 summary administrative action may be justified in
emergency situations."
160. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,535 (1981) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). The Court reasoned, however, that the prisoner did not state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, because he did not sufficiently allege a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 543 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. See id. at 555 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 556 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. See id.
I believe prison officials have an affirmative obligation to inform a prisoner who claims that
he is aggrieved by official action about the remedies available under state law. If they fail to
do so, then they should not be permitted to rely on the existence of such remedies as adequate
alternatives to a Section 1983 action for wrongful deprivation of property.
Id.
165. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
166. See id. at 298.
167. See id. at 303.
168. See id. at 299 (quoting Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540); supra Part L.A.6 (discussing Justice
Marshall's absolute fairness requirements).
169. See id. at 300. Justice Marshall was clear to lay down guidelines when he approved any
forgiveness of a hearing requirement. Justice Marshall believed that protection of the health and safety
of the public is a paramount governmental interest which justifies the lack of a hearing. See id. The
standard for judging the "imminent environmental harm" is very specific. See id, at 301. The relevant
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However, Justice Marshall concurred with the Court in Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill,170 where the majority held that a terminated school district
employee was entitled to a pre-termination opportunity in order to respond to the
charges made against them. 71 Justice Marshall wrote separately, however, to
affirm his belief that "public employees who may be discharged only for cause are
entitled, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to more than
"just notice and an opportunity to be heard before their wages are cut-off." '172
Justice Marshall stated:
To my mind, the disruption caused by a loss of wages may be so devastating to an
employee that, whenever there are substantial disputes about the evidence,
additional predeprivation procedures are necessary to minimize the risk of an
erroneous termination. That is, I place significantly greater weight than does the
Court on the public employee's substantial interest in the accuracy of the pre-
termination proceeding.'73
In National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Atchison, Topeka And Santa
Fe Railway Company,'74 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, held that the Rail
inquiry is not whether to issue a cessation order in a particular case, but whether the statutory procedure
itself is incapable of affording due process. See id. at 302. Discretion of any official action may be
abused, but due process does not require a judicial inquiry prior to exercising discretion. See id. at 303.
Any challenge to the imposition of penalties may not be made until those penalties are imposed. See
id. at 304-05.
170. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
171. Seeid.at533.
172. See id. at 548 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
I continue to believe that before the decision is made to terminate an employee's wages, the
employee is entitled to an opportunity to test the strength of the evidence "by confronting and
cross-examining adverse witnesses and by presenting witnesses on his own behalf, whenever
there are substantial disputes in testimonial evidence." Because the Court suggests that even
in this situation due process requires no more than notice and an opportunity to be heard
before wages are cut off, I am not able to join the Court's opinion in its entirety.
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 214 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)); see also supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses).
173. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 549. Justice Marshall continued:
I cannot and will not close my eyes today-as I could not 10 years ago-to the economic
situation of great numbers of public employees, and to the potentially traumatic effect of
wrongful discharge on a working person. Given that so very much is at stake, I am unable to
accept the Court's narrow view of the process due to a public employee before his wages are
terminated, and before he begins the long wait for a public agency to issue a final decision in
his case.
Id. at 551.
174. 470 U.S. 451 (1985).
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Passenger Service Act's requirement that private railroads reimburse Amtrak 75 for
rail travel privileges which it provided to the railroads' employees, former
employees, and their dependents did not constitute the taking of property without
due process of law.'76 The Court articulated that for a party to recover where
federal economic legislation infringes upon a constitutionally protected contractual
right, they must show that: "First, that the statute alters contractual rights or
obligations, [and if so,] whether that violation is of constitutional dimension[s];.
. . if the alteration is minimal, the inquiry may end at this stage." '177 The party
claiming federal statutory impairment of a private right must also prevail over the
presumption of constitutionality.' In order to overcome this presumption the
complaining party must show that Congress "'acted in an arbitrary and irrational
way.""' 7 9 Thus, for substantive due process Justice Marshall's fairness standard
is replaced by a "rational, reasoned" standard.'
In United States v. Locke, '' the Court held that The Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 did not take the holders' property without due process
of law, as they alleged in their complaint.8 2 The challenged Act required the
holders of unpatented mining claims to make annual filings or forfeit their
claims. 3 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, emphasized the Act's quite
adequate notice provisions in deeming it Constitutional.8 4
C. Related Constitutional Provisions
1. Article I, Section 8 [3]
Justice Marshall did not believe that the Commerce Clause lessened the
175. The National Railroad Passenger Corporation.
176. See Atchison, Topeka, 470 U.S. at 478-79.
177. See id. at 472.
178. See id.; see also supra Part tL.A.5 (discussing presumptions).
179. Atchison, Topeka, 470 U.S. at 472 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,
467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984)).
180. See id. at 477-78; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
181. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
182. See id. at 107.
183. See id.
184. See id.
In altering substantive rights through enactment of rules of general applicability, a legislature
generally provides constitutionally adequate process simply by [(1)] enacting the statute, [(2)]
publishing it, and, [(3)] to the extent the statute regulates private conduct, affording those
within the statute's reach a reasonable opportunity both to [(a)] familiarize themselves with
the general requirements imposed and [(b)] to comply with those requirements.
Id. at 108 (citations omitted). While he did not explicitly refer to fairness, as did Justice O'Connor in
her concurring opinion, notice is very much an element of that due process ingredient. See id. at 110;
see also supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
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latitude afforded the states under the Due Process Clause.'85
2. Article I, Section 10 [1]
Justice Marshall noted a distinction between the "principles embodied in Fifth
Amendment's due process guarantee[s] [and] the prohibitions against state
impairment of contracts under the Contract Clause, and ... to the extent the
standards differ, a less searching inquiry occurs in the review of federal economic
legislation."'86
3. The Bill of Rights
Justice Marshall was for complete application of the Bill of Rights to the
States by incorporating them into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'87 The First Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and
185. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623 (1981); Exxon Corp. v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Rev., 447 U.S. 207, 229-30 (1980).
186. See National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 470
U.S. 451, 472 n.25 (1985).
187. While a judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Justice Marshall faced formidable
opposition to his position in a double jeopardy case. See United States ex rel Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348
F.2d 844, 867-68 (2nd Cir. 1965).
Justice Cardozo, also in a double jeopardy case, opined that there was no wholesale applicability
of the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 326 (1937). Some, but not all, of those personal rights safeguarded by the first eight
Amendments against national action may also be safeguarded against state action; not because they are
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but because they are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty so
essential to due process of law. See id. at 326 n.4.
Legal Scholar, Richard Polenberg refers to Palko as "[an artistic decision, perhaps, but it was
a narrow palette Cardozo brought to his rendering of the Fourteenth Amendment. A later generation
of jurists would have a keener appreciation of the created possibilities implicit in its texture and
design." Richard Polenberg, Cardozo and the Criminal Law: Palko v. Connecticut Reconsidered, 2
J. SUP. CT. HIST. 92, 104 (1996).
Justice Marshall was one of those jurists. In Hetenyi he rejected Cardozo's due process rationale,
and found the questioned procedure violative of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause.
Hetenyi, 348 F.2d at 854. Later, as a Supreme Court Justice, Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the
Court in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), which specifically overruled Palko, and was the
death-knell for the opponents of incorporating the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 793-96.
Professor Chemerinsky has said: "In one sense the selective incorporationists prevailed in this
debate; never has the Supreme Court endorsed the total incorporationist approach. However, from a
practical perspective, the total incorporationists largely succeed in their objective because, one by one,
the Supreme Court found almost all of the provisions to be incorporated." See CHEMERINSKI, supra
note 116, at 381-82.
Although the debate over incorporation raged among Justices and scholars during the 1940's,
of course the Fifth Amendment through its Double Jeopardy, Equal Protection and
own due process components, are the most important amendments of the Bill of
Rights vis-a-vis due process of law.
4. The First Amendment
Justice Marshall said that the Due Process Clause adopted the principles of the
First Amendment, 8 and furnished no greater rights than did the First
Amendment."8 9 Justice Marshall also said that "'it is beyond debate that freedom
to engage in association for advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech."""' Justice Marshall found,
however, that "secular" reasons will save congressional action from being a direct
violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, or an indirect violation
of it via the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' 9'
When the Court upheld a New York statute that required applicants for the
practice of law to prove that they possess "the character and general fitness
requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law," the decision drew broad attack
from applicants who felt the requirement was vague and overbroad.'92 Justice
Marshall disagreed with the majority, agreeing with the applicants that the statute
was vague and overbroad.'93 According to Justice Marshall, "[t]he irreducible
vices of due process vagueness, aris[e] when those who may be penalized by a
legal rule cannot ascertain the rule's scope and avoid its burdens.' 94
Conversely, however, the Court struck down a different state statute that
required state employees take a loyalty oath to the state. 95 Justice Marshall
concurred in judgment, but wrote separately because he felt that the Court left the
clear impression that the unconstitutionality of the statute was limited to the
1950's, and 1960's, now the issue seems settled. [With few exceptionsi the Bill of Rights do
apply to state and local governments and, in almost all instances, with the same content
regardless of whether it is a challenge to federal, state, or local actions.
Id. at 385.
188. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386 (1987). Justice Marshall, writing for the Court,
held that a clerical employee, who heard about an attempt on the life of the President in a county
constable's office, had the First Amendment right to say, "[i]f they go for him again, I hope they get
him." See id. at 381.
189. Justice Marshall joined Justice White's plurality opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), noting that the Due Process Clause furnishes no greater rights than does
the First Amendment. See id. at 521 n.25.
190. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986) (quoting NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
191. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 n.14 (1971).
192. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 156 (1971).
193. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 706 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
194. Wadmond, 401 U.S. at 194-95.
195. See Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208-09 (1971); see also notes 145-48 and
accompanying text.
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"State's decision to regard unwillingness to take the oath as conclusive, irrebuttable
proof of the proscribed belief." 19 6 Justice Marshall did not believe that due process
was afforded by this "mechanistic approach to the question of proof."' 97
During the next term, the Court upheld a Massachusetts loyalty oath
requirement for public employees which consisted of two parts: Part I required the
affiant to uphold and defend the United States and commonwealth constitutions
and Part II required the affiant to agree to oppose the overthrow of the government
of the United States and the commonwealth.'98 Justice Marshall found that Part H
was "an overbroad infringement of protected expression and conduct.""' Justice
Marshall further stated that "[s]ince the overbreadth of the oath tends to infringe
areas of speech and conduct that may be protected by the Constitution, I believe
that it cannot stand."2'
In Bethel School District v. Fraser,2°' the Court upheld a punishment of
suspension from school for a speech that a school board considered disruptive.2 2
The sanctioned student sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on First Amendment and due
process grounds, claiming that he had no notice that his speech would subject him
to disciplinary sanctions.2 3 The Court held that the suspension did not rise to the
level of "a penal sanction calling for the full panoply of procedural due process
protection applicable to criminal prosecution."2 °4 Justice Marshall dissented even
though he recognized that the school administration "must be given wide latitude
to determine what forms of conduct are inconsistent with the school's educational
mission."2 °' Justice Marshall noted that there was, however, a First Amendment
impact. 2°6 The presence of speech foreclosed unquestioned acceptance of the
school's assessment of the situation; it demanded an analysis by the Court, and an
independent determination as to whether the punishment was justified.2 7 Justice
Marshall's assessment of the position the Court should have taken represents a
blending of First Amendment and due process jurisprudence.
196. Connell, 403 U.S. at 209 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
198. See Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 679-80 (1972).
199. Id. at 695 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 697 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
201. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
202. See id. at 678.
203. See id. at 679, 686.
204. See id.




5. The Fifth Amendment
a. Double Jeopardy
Between 1972 and 1989 Justice Marshall dissented in eight cases which
involved the impact of due process on the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Many of his dissents voiced his concern that the Court was not giving
sufficient deference to North Carolina v. Pearce,2 8 a 1969 decision which
attempted to eradicate vindictiveness in subsequent trials of criminal cases.2°
More than merely attempting to prevent vindictiveness on the part of the
subsequent tribunal, Justice Marshall believed that giving the defendant an
unnecessary dilemma involving an appeal offended the double jeopardy prohibi-
tion.21°
208. 395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
209. The Court in Pearce strongly proclaimed that "[d]ue process of law . . . requires that
vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no
part in the sentence he receives after a new trial." See id. at 725. Justice Marshall joined Justice
Douglas' concurring opinion in which Justice Douglas opined that "if for any reason a new trial is
granted and there is a conviction a second time, the second penalty imposed cannot exceed the first
penalty, if respect is had for the guarantee against double jeopardy." See id. at 726-27 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
210. See id. at 727. In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), Justice Marshall pointed out that
giving a defendant the right to appeal from an inferior court judgment, which entailed the possibility
of a more severe sentence was constitutionally flawed. See id. at 124 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "'[I]f
the first conviction has been set aside for nonconstitutional error, the imposition of a penalty upon the
defendant having successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy would be no less
a violation of due process of law."' Id. (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724). "'A defendant's exercise
of a right of appeal must be free and unfettered .... [I]t is unfair to use the great power given to the
court to determine sentence to place a defendant in the dilemma of making an unfree choice."' Id.
(quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724). Catching an echo of equal protection, Justice Marshall espoused
that "'[this Court has never held that the States are required to establish avenues of appellate review,
but it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned
distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts."' Id. at 125 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724). In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), the
Court held that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit a jury from
returning more severe sentences on retrial following a reversal of a prior conviction so long as the jury
is not informed of the prior sentence and the second sentence is not otherwise shown to be a product
of vindictiveness. See id. at 23-25. In his dissent Justice Marshall noted that the vindictiveness which
the Court was trying to guard against in Pearce was not the only issue in this type of case. See id. at
38 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall believed that creating an unnecessary dilemma for a
defendant offends due process: "For, by establishing one rule for sentencing by judges and another for
sentencing by juries, the Court places an unnecessary burden on the defendant's right to choose to be
tried by a jury after a successful appeal." Id. at 43-44 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "No legitimate state
interest is materially advanced by permitting a second jury to enhance punishment without limitations
like those placed by Pearce on judges, and such limitations would not substantially affect any such
interest." Id. at 46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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In Michigan v. Payne,211 the Court determined that Pearce was not to be
applied retroactively to respondent's conviction.212 Justice Marshall, in dissent,
said that this is not a retroactivity case213 and that "[tihis case raises the issue of
retroactivity only because of the almost unbelievable sluggishness of the appellate
process in Michigan." '214
Lee v. United States215 involved a bench trial where the judge found the
defendant was guilty beyond any reasonable doubt. 216 The judge dismissed the
information because the indictment did not allege specific intent required by the
applicable statute.2"7 Subsequently, the defendant was indicted for the same crime
and convicted. 218 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision. 219 Justice Marshall
said in dissent that a defendant has "no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has
that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due
process. 22°
In Swisher v. Brady,22' the Court held that a juvenile subjected to a hearing
before a Master, who had no power to enter a final order, was not placed in
jeopardy a second time when the Juvenile Court Judge reviewed the Master's
211. 412 U.S. 47 (1973).
212. See id. at 49.
213. See id. at 63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
214. Id. "The issue need not be framed as the 'retroactivity' of Pearce. The problem, as I see it,
is to devise procedures that will permit reviewing courts to determine whether the requirements of the
Due Process Clause have been met." Id. at 64 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The holding of Pearce is a simple one: the Due Process Clause requires States to adopt
procedures designed to minimize the possibility that a new sentence after a successful appeal
will be based in part on vindictiveness for the defendant's having taken the appeal. The Court
agrees that 'this basic due process protection is available equally to defendants resentenced
before and after the date of the decision in that case.' The question then is what procedures
are required to insure that that protection has been afforded defendants resentenced before
Pearce was decided. This question, like many of those involving retroactivity, relates to the
integrity of the judicial process, not to the limitations placed by the Constitution on police
behavior.
Id. (citations omitted). With regard to retroactive legislation, in general, Justice Marshall wrote in
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), that "[tlhe retrospective aspects of legislation,
as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process, and the justifications for the latter
may not suffice for the former." See id. at 17.
215. 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
216. See id. at 25-27.
217. Seeid. at 25.
218. See id. at 27.
219. See id. at 34.
220. Id. at 39 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The "petitioner was needlessly placed in jeopardy twice
for the same offense over his objection .... ." Id.
221. 438 U.S. 204 (1988).
report.222 Justice Marshall argued in his dissenting opinion that "Maryland's
scheme raises serious due process questions because the judge making the final
adjudication of guilt has not heard the evidence and may reverse the master's
findings of nondelinquency based on the judge's review of a cold record." '223
In Heath v. Alabama,224 a defendant plead guilty to "malice" murder in
Georgia in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment.225 Subsequently, he was
tried and convicted of murder in Alabama for the same offense and sentenced to
death.226 The Court held that under the "dual sovereignty" doctrine, prosecution
by two states for the same conduct is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment because a defendant who violates the peace and dignity of
two sovereigns by breaking the law of each, has committed two separate
offenses.227 In his dissent, Justice Marshall initially attacked the dual sovereignty
doctrine and said that it does not apply in the state/state situation. 28 Justice
Marshall then chided the Court for "refusing to consider the fundamental
unfairness of the process by which the petitioner stands condemned to die. 229
In Justice Marshall's view, double jeopardy can result even in situations where
222. Seeid. at219.
223. See id. at 229 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that even if the procedure
"avoided" double jeopardy problems, it "violates the Due Process Clause by permitting ultimate
factfinding by a judge who did not actually conduct the trial." See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); supra
note 60 and accompanying text (regarding the due process requirement that there be a proper review
of trial proceedings).
224. 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
225. See id. at 84.
226. See id. at 85-86.
227. See id. at 93.
228. See id. at 95 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
229. See id. at 101 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Marshall wrote:
I must confess that my quarrel with the Court's disposition of this case is based less upon how
this question was resolved than upon the fact that it was considered at all. Although, in
granting Heath's petition for certiorari, this Court ordered the parties to focus upon the dual
sovereignty issue, I believe the Court errs in refusing to consider the fundamental unfairness
of the process by which petitioner stands condemned to die.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall opined:
Even where the power of two sovereigns to pursue separate prosecutions for the same
crime has been undisputed, this Court has barred both governments from combining to do
together what each could not constitutionally do on its own. And just as the Constitution bars
one sovereign from facilitating another's prosecution by delivering testimony coerced under
promise of immunity or evidence illegally seized, I believe that it prohibits two sovereigns
from combining forces to ensure that a defendant receives only the trappings of criminal
process as he is sped along to execution.
Id. at 102 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Marshall further opined:
Georgia's efforts to secure petitioner's execution did not end with its acceptance of his guilty
plea. Its law enforcement officials went on to play leading roles as prosecution witnesses in
the Alabama trial .... Whether viewed as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause or
simply as an affront to the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, Alabama's
prosecution of petitioner cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.
Id. 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the second trial (which resulted in a more severe sentence than the first), is the
result of the judge's attempt to rectify the prosecutor's misconduct when a more
severe sentence is fixed in a subsequent trial.2"' The allegedly good motives of the
judge do not alter the rule.231 Justice Marshall emphasized that due to the
difficulties faced by the defendant in proving vindictiveness on the part of trial
judges, the actual fact of vindictiveness is not the sine qua non of the defendant's
constitutional right.232
230. See Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134,149 (1986). Justice Marshall reminded the Court in
his dissent of the teachings of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 771 (1969). The Court "[w]ith little
more than a passing nod" to that decision which created the presumption "to safeguard due process
rights... the majority first refuses to apply that rule in a case where those considerations are clearly
relevant, and then proceeds to rob that rule of any vitality even in cases in which it will be applied."
See McCullough, 475 U.S. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Pearce, 395 U.S. 771). Justice
Marshall discounted the fact that the defendant elected to be sentenced by the same judge who
sentenced him the first time. Vindictiveness must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new
trial.
Whether or not that judge had been the sentencing authority in the first proceeding, we would
fear that the judge would have had a "personal stake in the prior conviction" and a "motivation
to engage in self-vindication," as well as a wish to discourage "what [s]he regards as meritless
appeals." Moreover, it would not be appropriate to find a waiver of McCullough's due process
right in his exercise of his statutory right to elect his sentencer, especially in a case where
defendant's choice might have been influenced by a desire to avoid being sentenced by a jury
from a community that had been exposed to the considerable publicity surrounding his first
trial.
Id. at 149-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Chaffin v. Stychcombe, 412 US.
17, 33 n.21 (1973)).
231. See McCullough, 475 U.S. at 150 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted the
majority opinion's reasons and stated:
The majority reasons that, "[i]n contrast to Pearce, McCullough's second trial came
about because the trial judge herself concluded that the prosecutor's misconduct required it.
Granting McCullough's motion for a new trial hardly suggests any vindictiveness on the part
of the judge towards him." Such an observation betrays not only an insensitivity to the
motives that might underlie any trial judge's decision to grant a motion for a new trial, but also
a blindness to the peculiar circumstances surrounding the decision to grant a retrial in this
case.
Id. at 150 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 138-39) (alterations in original).
232. See id. at 155 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "The point is that the possibility they [considerations
establishing vindictiveness] did play such a part is sufficiently real, and proving actual prejudice,
sufficiently difficult, that a presumption of vindictiveness is as appropriate here as it was in Pearce."
Id. at 151 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall wrote:
A lot has happened since the final day of the October 1968 Term, the day North Carolina
v. Pearce was handed down. But nothing has happened since then that casts any doubt on the
need for the guarantee of fairness that this Court held out to defendants in Pearce. The
majority today begins by denying respondent the promise of that guarantee even though his
case clearly calls for its application. The Court then reaches out to render the guarantee of
little value to all defendants, even to those whose plight was the explicit concern of the Pearce
Court in 1969. To renege on the guarantee of Pearce is wrong. To do so while pretending not
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In Alabama v. Smith,233 a defendant plea bargained and received a sentence of
thirty years for two counts to be served concurrently.234 Later the defendant was
successful in having his guilty plea vacated based upon misinformation given to
him by the judge during the initial plea bargaining.235 He was retried on the
original three counts before the same judge.236 Upon retrial, ajury found him guilty
on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to life for one count, plus a concurrent
life term for the second count and a consecutive term of 150 years on the third
count.237 Despite the presumption of Pearce, the Court held that there was no
vindictiveness violation of the Due Process Clause because due process requires
that vindictiveness against defendant, who successfully attacks his first conviction,
plays no part in the sentence he receives in a new trial.238 The Court stated that the
Due Process Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment
upon retrial after appeal, but only by actions that pose a realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness.239 Justice Marshall dissented.24°
b. Equal Protection
The Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, does not contain a
provision guaranteeing equal protection of the laws of the federal government.
241
Thus, the only way equal protection is applied to Federal laws is through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 42 Justice Marshall, as an attorney
representing the interest of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in Boiling v. Sharpe
243
to is a shame. I dissent.
Id. at 156 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
233. 490 U.S. 794 (1989).




238. See id. at 802.
239. See id. at 796.
240. See id. at 803-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall did not mention due process per
se, but returned to the quest which he and Justice Douglas made in Pearce: ."[i]f for any reason a new
trial is granted and there is a conviction a second time, the second penalty imposed cannot exceed the
first penalty, if respect is had for the guarantee against double jeopardy."' See id. (quoting North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,726-27 (1969)) (emphasis in original).
241. See Gay Gellhorn, Justice Thurgood Marshall's Jurisprudence of Equal Protection of the
Laws and the Poor, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 442 (1994); TuSHNET, supra note 33, at 94-115; Karen A.
Winn, Note, Justice Marshall and Equal Protection at Review: A Spectrum of Standards?, 64 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1251, 1251-52 (1986).
242. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954).
243. 347 U.S. 497. Spottswood T. Bolling sued C. Melvin Sharpe and other school officials arguing
that segregation of black children in District of Columbia schools violated his Fifth Amendment right
to due process of law. See id. at 498. The defense argued that the fact that the nation's capital had
allowed segregation to exist so long in its schools evidenced that Congress never intended integration.
See id. at 497; see also ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL
96-97 (1992) (discussing Justice Marshall's involvement as an attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense
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produced such a result.2' Not until the Bolling decision in 1954,/ could a
fundamental right be protected under either or both clauses.~" Now, when anyone
is denied a fundamental right, the Due Process Clause is violated and if a law
denies a fundamental right to some while offering it to others, both the Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clauses are violated.24 Thus, not only was
Justice Marshall acutely attuned to the fact that there was an equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment, but he felt strongly that equal protection and
due process, as found in both clauses, shared some common ground. Because the
Equal Protection Clause was created in 1868, but not made applicable to the federal
government until 1954,24 Justice Marshall was not confined to any era's concept
of equality, or, for that matter, to a static notion of due process."
Early in his Supreme Court career, Justice Marshall announced the judgment
of the Court in a case which gave him the opportunity to express his concept of
equal protection in due process terms.25° When equal protection of the laws is
denied to a certain person or group of persons, not only the ostensibly aggrieved
people suffer, but those indirectly involved suffer as well.25 1 Justice Marshall said
Fund).
244. Justice Marshall, later writing as a Supreme Court Justice, recognized that accomplishment
in several opinions. See Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233,247 n.4 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870,873 n.2 (1984); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
558 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 26 n.3 (1980);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,449 n.14 (1971).
245. Boiling was decided on the same day as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
246. As Justice Marshall stated in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), there are "separate but
related inquiries that due process and equal protection must trigger." See id. at 76 n.3.
247. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 116, at 639.
248. See Brown, 347 U.S. 488 and related cases.
249. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24,77 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
stated in his dissenting opinion:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era. In
determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to
historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue
of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights.
Id. at 76-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669
(1966)).
250. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493,505-07 (1972). While it was the opinion of the Court, it was
a plurality opinion because Justice Marshall was joined only by Justices Douglas and Stewart. Justice
White wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Powell; Chief Justice Burger wrote
a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined. See id.
251. In Kiff, a Caucasian was indicted by a grand jury and convicted by a petit jury of burglary. See
id. at 494. In his appeal, Petitioner claimed that black people were excluded from both juries in a
systematic manner, thereby ensuring his indictment and later conviction. See id. at 497. Six Justices
voted to hold the conviction invalid under the Due Process Clause. Justice Marshall's opinion, though
centering on due process, also clearly demonstrated its relationship to equal protection. See id. Justice
that a white person who is tried by a jury from which black persons have been
excluded, is deprived of equal protection of the laws.252 Justice Marshall further
believed that presuming that an African-American defendant will be prejudiced by
a jury from which members of his race have been excluded, without making such
a presumption in the reverse situation "takes too narrow a view of the kinds of
harm that flow from discrimination injury selection." '253 Starting with the premise
that a basic requirement of due process is a fair trial in a fair tribunal,254 Justice
Marshall reasoned that a judge could not remain consistent with due process and
try a case in which he had a "financial stake in the outcome."255 Justice Marshall
opined that, although in exceptional cases justice might be done, it would not be
fair to subject a defendant to such potential bias. 6 Had Justice Marshall stopped
at this point, one could detect a due process flavor to his analysis. Justice Marshall,
however, went further and demonstrated the juxtaposition of equal protection and
due process. Unequal treatment not only lacks fairness toward the party involved,
but also toward his community, who might also be a party deprived of the rich
mixture of all the elements of that community.2"' Justice Marshall said that the
"exclusion of a discernible class fromjury service injures not only those defendants
who belong to the excluded class, but other defendants as well, in that it destroys
the possibility that the jury will reflect a representative cross section of the
community. 258
The next case Justice Marshall authored could have been decided on equal
protection or due process grounds, but the majority decided the case solely on equal
Marshall stated that the Court need not consider Petitioner's claimed violation of equal protection rights
"in light of her disposition." See id. at 497 n.5.
252. See id. at 498.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 501; see also notes 60-83 and accompanying text (concemingfair trials).
255. See Kiff, 407 U.S. at 502.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 500.
258. Id. Justice Marshall said that the Court in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), recognized
this principle of jury diversity in connection with Sixth Amendment rights. In a Kiff footnote, Justice
Marshall quoted Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), which rejected the exclusion of women
from jury service:
"[Tihe two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from
a community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among
the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either may not in a given case make an
iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded."
Kiff, 407 U.S. at 504 n.12 (citations omitted) (quoting Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193). When the venire
excludes a certain class, the whole class, and not just the defendant, is denied the "privilege of
participating equally ... in the administration of justice, and the whole class is stigmatized by declaring
them unfit for jury service and thereby putting 'a brand upon them, affixed by law, an assertion of their
inferiority."' Id. at 499 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)). Justice
Marshall's example demonstrates that the whole fabric of a society is weakened by extracting certain
components, regardless of their supposed lack of symbiosis.
336
[Vol. 26: 289, 1999] Thurgood Marshall and the Holy Grail
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
protection grounds. 259 Justice Marshall's reasoning was that a fundamental right
was being violated, specifically the right to marry." The Equal Protection Clause
will not permit a violation of such a fundamental right.2 1 Justice Marshall used the
Due Process Clause, however, to establish that the right was fundamental.262 The
conclusion is inescapable, that in Justice Marshall's thinking, due process is a sine
qua non to this type of application of equal protection.263
In six cases, three involving the Fourteenth Amendment and three concerning
the Fifth Amendment, Justice Marshall used due process under the Equal
Protection Clause to strike at the rational basis test for reviewing the constitutional-
ity of statutes.2M
For example, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,265 the
Court held that Texas school districts' supplementation of state aid through a
property ad valorem tax did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the Court found that the tax system, though
admittedly not perfect, bore a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose.266 In
259. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,391-96 (1978). Justice Stewart agreed with the Court's
holding that the statute was unconstitutional, but reasoned that the basis of its invalidity was the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
260. A Wisconsin statute mandated that certain residents receive a court order granting permission
to marry. See id. at 375. Individuals were denied permission unless proof of compliance with all child
support obligations was submitted. See id.
261. See id. at 386. "it is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level
of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships."
Id. Such point having been established, Justice Marshall said that "[w]hen a statutory classification
significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests." See id. at 388. Even when the state interests are legitimate and substantial, where the means
selected by the state to achieve those interests impinge upon a fundamental interest-the right to many
in this case-the state statute cannot be sustained. See id.
262. "[Tlhe right 'to marry, establish a home and bring up children' is a central part of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 384 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923)); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
notes 109-48 and accompanying text (concerning liberty interests).
263. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), 37 U.S.C. sections 401,403 and 10 U.S.C.
sections 1072, 1076 permitted a serviceman to claim his spouse as a dependent in order to obtain
certain increased benefits, whether or not she was actually dependent upon him. A servicewoman,
however, was not able to claim her husband as a dependent, unless she proved that her husband was
actually dependent. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691. The plurality, in which Justice Marshall joined,
relied on the Due Process Clause to determine that the federal statutes involved clearly violated the
Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment. See id.
264. Curiously the "rational basis" test was developed by Justice Douglas, with whom Justice
Marshall often agreed. Professor Tushnet explains that the test was developed by New Deal jurists to
preserve their New Deal legislation. See TUSHNET, supra note 33, at 95.
265. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
266. See id. at 55.
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his sixty-six page dissent, Justice Marshall stated emphatically that strict scrutiny,
rather than rational basis was the appropriate standard of review because a
fundamental interest was involved.267 The Court, he pointed out, considered only
interests guaranteed by the Constitution as fundamental, and because public
education was not constitutionally guaranteed, 6 ' it was not a fundamental right.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Borras,269 the Court, using a variation of the
rational basis test, held that an ordinance which restricted land use to one-family
dwelling violated neither the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, nor the unrelated students' rights of association, travel, and privacy under the
First Amendment.7 ° Justice Marshall believed that both Amendments were
violated.27 "My disagreement with the Court today is based upon my view that the
ordinance in this case unnecessarily burdens appellees' First Amendment freedom
of association and their constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. 2 2  The
Fourteenth Amendment was brought into Justice Marshall's paradigm via its
interrelated Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 73 Justice Marshall
believed that a "strict equal protection scrutiny" was the appropriate test to apply. 274
Justice Marshall said that the right of privacy was "implicit" in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause because "the freedom of association is often
inextricably entwined with the constitutionally guaranteed right of privacy." '275
In Bell v. Wolfish, 276 a case involving prison administration, Justice Marshall
again dissented.277 Justice Marshall opined:
When assessing the restrictions on detainees, we must consider the cumulative
impact of restraints imposed during confinement. Incarceration of itself clearly
represents a profound infringement of liberty, and each additional imposition
increases the severity of that initial deprivation. Since any restraint thus has a
serious effect on detainees, I believe the Government must bear a more rigorous
burden of justification than the rational basis standard mandates. At a minimum, I
would require a showing that a restriction is substantially necessary to jail
administration. Where the imposition is of particular gravity, that is, where it
implicates interests of fundamental importance or inflicts significant harms, the
Government should demonstrate that the restriction serves a compelling necessity
of jail administration. 27
267. See id. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
268. See id. at 110 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
269. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
270. See id. at 1. "Family" was defined to exclude more than two persons unrelated to each other
by blood, adoption, or marriage. See id.
271. See id. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
273. See id. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
274. See id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
275. See id. at 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also note 130 and accompanying text.
276. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
277. See id. at 523, 563.
278. Id. at 570 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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In another case, Richardson v. Belcher,279 the Court found that section 224 of
the Social Security Act, which required a reduction in social security benefits to
reflect workmen's compensation payments, had a rational basis and did not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.28 ° In writing for the dissent,
Justice Marshall, adhering to his viewpoint, believed that there was denial of due
process under the challenged Act sounding in equal protection.28 ' Justice Marshall
wrote that the Act "places its severe burden on a single class of disabled persons
without adequate justification." '282 He further wrote:
If the majority's "rational basis" test in fact is to have any meaning, Congress cannot
be permitted to single out recipients of workmen's compensation for this adverse
treatment. The burden of reduced federal benefits-so devastating to the families of
the once-working poor-cannot be imposed arbitrarily under, the Fifth Amendment.
In my view that has happened here.283
Similarly, in Marshall v. United States,284 the Court held that the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment was not violated by Title II of the
National Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 (NARA), which excluded from
"rehabilitative commitment, in lieu of penal incarceration, addicts with two or more
prior felony convictions." '285 Once again, Justice Marshall thought that the Court
was guilty of shortsightedness in using the rational basis test.286 Drawing upon the
Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel an unusual punishment, Justice Marshall
pointed to the growing awareness that in drug related crimes Eighth Amendment
problems exist.28 7 Justice Marshall thus hinted that there may be growing support
for treatment of drug offenders as a separate class entitled to sensitive recognition,
279. 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
280. See id. at 84.
281. See id. at 88-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
282. See id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to the appellee's specific complaint).
283. Id. at 95-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In support of his position, Justice Marshall referred to
his dissent in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), an equal protection case involving a state
subsistence program. See Richardson, 404 U.S. at 90 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Dandrige, Justice
Marshall insisted that the courts cannot equate business-oriented legislation with legislation providing
for basic human needs when deciding whether to use the rational basis test. See id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citing Dandrige, 397 U.S. at 521).
284. 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
285. See id. at 430.
286. See id. at 438-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
287. See id. at 439 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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therefore, triggering due process concerns."'
In Vance v. Bradley,289 the Supreme Court noted that section 632 of the
Foreign Service Act, which required federal employees covered by the Foreign
Service retirement and disability system to retire at age sixty; whereas there was no
such requirement for Civil Service Employees covered by the Civil Service
retirement and disability system."' The Act was challenged on the basis that it
violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. 29' The Court,
again using the rational basis test, upheld the statute.292 In a strong dissent, leaving
no doubt that he was dissatisfied with any test which did not consider fundamental
rights, Justice Marshall wrote that "[w]hen legislative action affects individual
interests of such dimension, a heightened level of judicial scrutiny is
appropriate.
293
A strict construction approach was finally recognized by members of the
Supreme Court in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 294 an equal protection case,
but one whose spirit was diametrically opposed to that of Justice Marshall. The
plurality opinion 295 in Croson said that when legislation uses a classification based
on race, and its ostensible purpose is remedial, strict scrutiny is applied to
determine whether the racial disparity truly needs remedial treatment or is actually
288. See id. Consistent with his thinking in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), Justice
Marshall indicated that in this type of equal protection application, due process is a prerequisite. See
Marshall, 414 U.S. at 439 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Zablocki, see supra notes 259-
63 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall wrote:
Mr. Justice Jackson, himself a strong opponent of substantive due process, once argued
that the vitality of the Equal Protection Clause as a ground for constitutional adjudication is
that it "does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand."
Rather, it merely sends the legislature back to the drawing board to draft a statute which more
precisely and more even handedly solves the problem. I would not deny Congress the right to
limit the NARA program to persons whose criminal activity was a product of their addiction,
to those who were likely to be rehabilitated, or to those whose presence in a treatment center
would not interfere with the rehabilitation of others. But I would have Congress make a
second attempt at drafting a statute which actually furthers these ends.
Marshall, 414 U.S. at 440 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
289. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
290. See id. at 95-96.
291. See id. at 96-97.
292. See id. at 112.
293. See id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In this case, as in several of his opinions, Justice
Marshall did not use the term due process per se, but his characterization of the benefit affected as
"among the most important of [a person's] personal concerns that Government action would be likely
to affect" leaves no doubt as to his meaning. See id. Justice Marshall concluded his dissent with the
following: "Appellees presented substantial evidence that the mandatory retirement provision has not
accomplished the purposes for which it was designed. The Government failed to establish otherwise.
Where individuals' livelihood, self-esteem, and dignity are so critically affected, I do not believe the
Government should be relieved of that responsibility." Id. at 124 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
294. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
295. Justice O'Connor announced thejudgment of the Court and wrote an opinion in which Justices
White, Rehnquist and Kennedy joined. See id. at 476.
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"benign." 296 In this particular case, the governing body of the City of Richmond,
Virginia established a set-aside program for the benefit of minority contractors.297
Justice O'Connor found that the situation was "benign," because it was the result
of "past societal discrimination." '298 Justice Marshall, in dissent, said that not every
legislated classification requires strict scrutiny; only those "governmental actions
that themselves are racist.
'299
In Jean v. Nelson,300 a group of Haitian nationals, who were undocumented
and unadmitted aliens, claimed that a new policy of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) violated the equal protection guarantee component of
the Fifth Amendment because it discriminated against them on the basis of race and
national origin.3' The Court held that it would not consider the constitutional
arguments of petitioners, because the circuit court of appeals had remanded the
case to the district court for factual determinations as to whether the INS officials
exercised their discretion without regard to race or national origin. °2 In dissent,
Justice Marshall said that the majority was guilty of "'disingenuous evasion.'"33
296. See id. at 493.
297. See id. at 477-78.
298. See id. at 505.
299. See id. at 551 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall opined:
Racial classifications "drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to another or
because they put the weight of government behind racial hatred and separatism" warrant the
strictest judicial scrutiny because of the very irrelevance of these rationales. By contrast, racial
classification drawn for the purpose of remedying the effects of discrimination that itself was
race based have a highly pertinent basis: the tragic and indelible fact that discrimination
against blacks and other racial minorities in this Nation has pervaded our Nation's history and
continues to scar our society.
Id. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 357-58 (1978)). Justice Marshall, continuing his opinion, stated:
"Because the consideration of race is relevant to remedying the continuing effects of past racial
discrimination, and because governmental programs employing racial classifications for
remedial purposes can be crafted to avoid stigmatization ... such programs should not be
subjected to conventional 'strict scrutiny'-scrutiny that is strict in theory, but fatal in fact."
Id. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 518-19 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
300. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
301. See id. at 848-49. In 1981 the INS changed a thirty year policy of general parole for
undocumented aliens seeking admission to this country to a policy (based on no statute or regulation)
of detention "without parole for [aliens] who could not present a prima facie case for admission." See
id. at 849.
302. See id. at 854-55.
303. See id. at 858 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96
(1985)). Justice Marshall said that while a resident alien's ultimate right to remain in the United States
is subject to alteration by statute or regulation, it does not follow that he or she is thereby deprived of
a constitutional right to procedural due process. See id. at 871 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Kwong
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601 (1953)). "'His status as a person within the meaning and
Justice Marshall wanted the Court to instruct the lower courts on equal protection
and due process, because:
[A]ny limitations on the applicability of the Constitution within our territorial
jurisdiction fly in the face of this Court's long-held and recently reaffirmed
commitment to apply the Constitution's due process and equal protection guarantees
to all individuals within the reach of our sovereignty .... Indeed, by its express
terms, the Fourteenth Amendment prescribes that "[no] State... shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."3"
In an immigration case, Fiallo v. Bello,3°5 Justice Marshall again demonstrated
his blending of due process with equal protection. The Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 granted a preference status to a certain classification of
protection of the Fifth Amendment cannot be capriciously taken from him."' Id. at 871-72 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (quoting Chew, 344 U.S. at 601). The decision in Chew, said Justice Marshall, was that
the alien's due process rights were violated; hence the broad notion that excludable aliens are not within
the protection of the Fifth Amendment is dictum. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
continued: "[o]ur case law makes clear that excludable aliens do, in fact, enjoy Fifth Amendment
protection," without making a distinction between equal protection and due process. See id. at 873
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
The right of an unadmitted alien to Fifth Amendment due process protection at trial is
universally respected by the lower federal courts and is acknowledged by the Government.
Surely it would defy logic to say that a precondition for the applicability of the Constitution
is an allegation that an alien committed a crime. There is no basis for conferring constitutional
rights only on those unadmitted aliens who violate our society's norms.
Id. (citations omitted). According to Justice Marshall, the notion, moreover, that the Constitution
protects an alien from deprivation of property, but not from life or liberty is simply irrational. See id.
at 874 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
304. Id. at 875-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). Justice
Marshall noted the importance of universal application of due process in light of the Fourteenth
Amendment analysis which debunked the fiction that freed slaves were not United States citizens. See
id. at 875 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393,404 (1857)). Justice Marshall
said that the Courts are "obliged to determine whether decisions concerning the parole of unadmitted
aliens are consistent with due process and cannot 'pass back the buck to an assertedly all-powerful and
unimpeachable Congress."' See id. at 876 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts; An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 1362, 1394(1953)). Justice Marshall opined that "the proper constitutional inquiry must concern
the scope of the equal protection and due process rights at stake, and not whether the Due Process
Clause can be invoked at all." See id. at 876-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated:
The narrow question presented by this case is whether, in deciding which aliens will be
paroled into the United States pending the determination of their admissibility, the
Government may discriminate on the basis of race and national origin even in the absence of
any reasons closely related to immigration concerns. To my mind, the Constitution clearly
provides that it may not. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand for a determination of the scope of petitioners' equal protection rights.
Id. at 881-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
305. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
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aliens over others.3° Justice Marshall viewed this as invidious discrimination
hiding in immigration legislation.3 7
6. The Sixth Amendment
Justice Marshall believed that the Due Process Clause contained a "looser"
standard than the Sixth Amendment,3°s but that both guaranteed the defendant an
impartial jury."
In Weatherford v. Bursey,1 ° an incarcerated criminal sued an undercover agent
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his Sixth Amendmentright to counsel and his
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial were violated by the undercover agent
who met on two occasions with the plaintiff and his counsel.31 The Court held that
the Sixth Amendment does not per se prohibit an undercover agent to meet with a
defendant's counsel, and that the Due Process Clause does not demand that the
prosecution provide defendants with a pre-trial list of witnesses who will testify
against the defense.3"2 In his dissent, Justice Marshall treated the two constitutional
provisions separately.313 Justice Marshall opined that fairness was required by the
Due Process Clause, and was specifically required in certain fundamental rights
such as discovery, stating that "[d]ue process requires that discovery 'be a two-way
306. See id. at 800. United States citizens may petition for parents, children, and siblings, who are
aliens, whereas "lawful permanent residents" may petition only for alien: children. Seeid.
307. See id. at 816 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "When Congress draws such lines among citizens,
the Constitution requires that the decision comport with Fifth Amendment principles of equal protection
and due process. The simple fact that the discrimination is set in immigration legislation cannot
insulate from scrutiny the invidious abridgment of citizens' fundamental interests." Id. at 807
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
308. See United States v. Lavelle, 306 F.2d 216, 219 n.5 (2d Cir. 1962). What Justice Marshall
must have meant by this is that the Due Process Clause, of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
is more encompassing than is the Sixth Amendment. In Lavelle, the issue was whether a criminal
defendant waived his right to counsel, and also whether the defendant should have made an allegation
regarding his guilt. See id. at 217. Justice Marshall wrote that "'although [the defendant) could not
deny that he had committed the offense he did not actually know that he was guilty either.' Id. at 218-
19 (quoting United States ex rel. Savini v. Jackson, 250 F.2d 349, 352 (2nd Cir. 1957)). Justice
Marshall added that "[i]f such an allegation is unnecessary under the looser standards of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it certainly is not required under the Sixth Amendment
itself." Id. at 219 n.15.
309. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 439 (1991) (noting the Court's position that pretrial
publicity may thwart the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury).
310. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
311. See id. at 545. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he was lulled into a false sense of
security, interfering with his trial preparations and denying him due process of law. See id. at 549.
312. Seeid. at545.
313. See id. at 562 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
street.' ' '314 In connection with the Sixth Amendment, Justice Marshall wrote that
"it has long been recognized that 'the essence of the Sixth Amendment right is...
privacy of communication with counsel.""'3 5 With regard to both these constitu-
tional rights, as was his usual position, it did not matter to Justice Marshall whether
or not harm actually resulted from the violation of both of these constitutional
rights, the possibility of violation was enough.316
In Taylor v. Hayes,3t7 the Court held that a judge who punished a trial lawyer
for contempt without giving him an opportunity to be heard in defense or mitigation
before sentencing him, violated the attorney's due process rights. 8 The Court held
that the attorney should have been given reasonable notice of the charges against
him and an opportunity to be heard before a different judge.1 9 The lawyer was not
entitled to a jury trial, however, since no more than a six month sentence was
actually imposed.32 ° In dissent, Justice Marshall said that since the fairness of the
process was suspect, the Sixth Amendment is triggered, requiring the scrutiny of
a jury.321
In Middendorf v. Henry,3 2 2 the Court held that there is no Sixth'Amendment
right to counsel in a summary court-martial, because that proceeding is not a
"criminal prosecution., 32 3 It reversed the circuit court's holding that the due
process standards set by Gagnon v. Scarpelli3 24 applied to the case at bar.323 Justice
Marshall, however, was in favor of applying Gagnon's due process standards to
court-martial proceedings. 26 He would have supported these standards by the
further application of the Sixth Amendment. 27 In his dissent, Justice Marshall
314. See id. (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470,477 (1973)); see also supra note 73-75 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Marshall's concept of due process with regard to discovery).
315. See id. at 563 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213,1 224
(2nd Cir. 1973)).
316. Justice Marshall stated:
But even if I were to agree that unintended and undisclosed interceptions by government
witness employees affect neither the fairness of trials nor the effectiveness of defense counsel,
I still could not join in upholding the practice. For in my view, the precious constitutional
rights at stake here, like other constitutional rights, need "breathing space to survive," and a
prophylactic prohibition on all intrusions of this sort is therefore essential. A rule that offers
defendants relief only when they can prove "intent" or "disclosure" is, I fear, little better than
no rule at all.
Id. at 565 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).
317. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
318. Seeid. at497.
319. See id. at 498-504.
320. See id. at 495-96.
321. See id. at 505 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
322. 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
323. See id. at 42.
324. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
325. See Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 42-43.
326. See id. at 54, n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
327. . See id. at 55-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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made it clear that the proceeding was criminal because the serviceperson can be
sentenced to life imprisonment. 28 It is true that a summary court-martial cannot
adjudge confinement in excess of one month, but the Court said that the length of
the confinement was wholly irrelevant in determining the right to counsel.329
In Wainwright v. Toma,33° a state prisoner's petition for certiorari to the state
supreme court was denied because his retained counsel had failed to timely file the
petition, even though he had informed the accused that he would do so and the
accused relied on his counsel's promise. 33 Without mentioning the Sixth
Amendment per se, the Court held that a state prisoner does not have a constitu-
tional right to counsel.332 Justice Marshall disagreed and stated: "I believe that a
defendant does have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state
appeals ... where a criminal conviction is challenged. 333 In Justice Marshall's
view, even if the specific relief could not be supplied by the Sixth Amendment, the
Due Process Clause furnished the same remedy.
3 4
The Court in Strickland v. Washington,335 adopted a reasonableness standard
to govern the attorney for an accused.336 Justice Marshall's objection to the Court's
ruling was that it failed to apply any due process standards to the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. 3 7  He said that it gives practically no indication of what is
328. See id. at 51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
329. See Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 56 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 37 (1972)). Justice Marshall opined:
The right to counsel has been termed "the most pervasive" of all the rights accorded an
accused. As a result of the Court's action today, of all accused persons protected by the United
States Constitution-federal defendants and state defendants, juveniles and adults, civilians and
soldiers-only those enlisted men tried by summary court-martial can be imprisoned without
having been accorded the right to counsel. I would have expected that such a result would
have been based on justifications far more substantial than those relied on by the Court.
Id. at 72 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra note 65 and accompanying text for further reference to
Justice Marshall's position as to the right to counsel protected by due process.
330. 455 U.S. 586 (1982).
331. See id. at 586.
332. See id. at 587-88 (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)).
333. Id. at 588 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
334. See id. at 589 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall opined:
I would hold that when a defendant can show that he reasonably relied on his attorney's
promise to seek discretionary review, due process requires the State to consider his application,
even when the application is untimely. To deny the right to seek discretionary review simply
because of counsel's error is fundamentally unfair. Requiring the state courts to consider
untimely applications when a defendant can show that he reasonably relied on his counsel will
not impose a heavy burden.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
335. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
336. See id. at 669.
337. See id. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
expected of counsel.33 Calling upon the due process concept of fairness, Justice
Marshall wrote:
I object to the prejudice standard adopted by the Court for two independent
reasons. First, it is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a
trial in which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his lawyer
had been competent.
Second and more fundamentally, the assumption on which the Court's holding
rests is that the only purpose of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance
of counsel is to reduce the chance that innocent persons will be convicted. In my
view, the guarantee also functions to ensure that convictions are obtained only
through fundamentally fair procedures. The majority contends that the Sixth
Amendment is not violated when a manifestly guilty defendant is convicted after a
trial in which he was represented by a manifestly ineffective attorney. I cannot
agree. Every defendant is entitled to a trial in which his interests are vigorously and
conscientiously advocated by an able lawyer. A proceeding in which the defendant
does not receive meaningful assistance in meeting the forces of the State does not,
in my opinion, constitute due process.339
In Perry v. Leeke,3 ° the Court held that if a trial judge in a criminal trial
declares a short recess, he has the absolute discretion to forbid or limit a defen-
dant's consultation with his attorney. 3" Justice Marshall, in his dissent, left no
doubt as to the relationship of the Due Process Clause to the Sixth Amendment.
He said "[n]eedless to say, the due process concerns underpinning the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel are designed to ensure a fair trial for the defendant,
not the State." 2
338. See id. at 707-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated:
My objection to the performance standard adopted by the Court is that it is so malleable that,
in practice, it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in
which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts. To tell lawyers and
lower courts that counsel for a criminal defendant must behave "reasonably" and must act like
a "reasonably competent attorney," is to tell them almost nothing.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
339. Id. at 710-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
340. 488 U.S. 272 (1989).
341. See id. at 284-85. In so holding, the Court distinguished Geders v. United States, 425 U.S.
80 (1976), which held that an overnight prohibition of consultation with counsel violated the Sixth
Amendment. See Perry, 488 U.S. at 284-85.
342. Perry, 488 U.S. at 297 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
By ensuring a defendant's right to have counsel, which includes the concomitant right to
communicate with counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings, the Constitution seeks
"to minimize the imbalance in the adversary system." The majority twice disserves this noble
goal-by isolating the defendant at a time when counsel's assistance is perhaps most needed,
and by ignoring the stark unfairness of according prosecution witnesses the very prerogatives
denied the defendant. The Constitution does not permit this new restriction on the Sixth
'Amendment right to counsel.
Id. at 298 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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7. The Eighth Amendment
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment is fully
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."4 Justice Marshall thought of the Fourteenth Amendment provision
as more than just a conduit. When discussing the death penalty in Furman v.
Georgia,' Justice Marshall said that there comes a point in time when a
"presumption of constitutionality accorded legislative acts gives way to a realistic
assessment of those acts. ' ' "S That time arrives when there is just no rational basis
for the legislation.346 That analysis, in Justice Marshall's view paralleled a
substantive due process analysis, with one difference. When he considered the
death penalty, he thought it was unconstitutional not only because it was irrational,
but because it was also excessive and unnecessary.34 "The concepts of cruel and
unusual punishment and substantive due process become," in Justice Marshall's
eyes, "so close[,] as to merge when the substantive due process is stated" in terms
of requiring a compelling justification to legitimize capital punishment.348
This merger of due process and cruel and inhuman punishment was demon-
strated by two cases in which the Court held the complained of acts permissible
because they were ostensively justified on the grounds of regulation rather than
punishment.349 In Block v. Rutherford,35 a case where detainees were deprived of
contact with spouses, friends, and relatives, and were subject to random shake-
down searches of their quarters in their absence, the Court found that the detainees
were not deprived of due process of law because the ostensible reason given by the
authorities was that such action was needed for prison security, rather than
343. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 n.1 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
344. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
345. See id. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring).
346. See id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
347. See id. at 359 n. 141 (Marshall, J., concurring).
348. See id. (Marshall, J., concurring). Continuing his analysis, Justice Marshall stated:
[B]ecause capital punishment deprives an individual of a fundamental right (i.e., the right to
life), the State needs a compelling interest to justify it. Thus stated, the substantive due
process argument reiterates what is essentially the primary purpose of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment-i.e., punishment may not be more severe than
is necessary to serve the legitimate interests of the State.
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring); see also supra Part HI.B. I (discussing Justice Marshall's concept of due
process as it relates to the death penalty).
349. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 582 (1984); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
741 (1987).
350. 468 U.S. 576.
punishment.35' Justice Marshall dissented. He spoke of due process and cruel and
inhuman punishment in equal terms and believed that the majority had a "pinched"
concept of both due to their blind reliance on the state's proposed rational basis.352
In United States v. Salerno,353 the Court considered the Bail Reform Act of
1984, which allows a federal court to detain an arrestee pending trial if the
government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence at an evidentiary
hearing that no release condition will "reasonably assure ... the safety of any other
person and the community. 354 The Respondent argued that his substantive due
process right was violated because pretrial detention constitutes impermissible
punishment before trial.355 The Court held that the Act contravened neither the Due
Process Clause nor the Eighth Amendment's proscription against excessive bail
bonds. 56 In dissent, Justice Marshall stated that dividing the analysis of the Act
into two parts-due process and Eighth Amendment-was a "[flalse dichotomy,"357
and "sterile formalism" '358 because it divided a unitary argument into two
independent parts and then professed to demonstrate that the parts were individu-
ally inadequate.359 Justice Marshall further argued that the majority had a cramped
concept of substantive due process because:
The majority proceeds as though the only substantive right protected by the Due
Process Clause is a right to be free from punishment before conviction. The
majority's technique for infringing this right is simple: merely redefine any measure
which is claimed to be punishment as "regulation" and, magically, the Constitution
no longer prohibits its imposition.360
351. See id. at 588.
352. See id. at 596 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall wrote:
Guided by an unwarranted confidence in the good faith and "expertise" of prison
administrators and by a pinched conception of the meaning of the Due Process Clause and the
Eighth Amendment, a majority of the Court increasingly appears willing to sanction any prison
condition for which the majority can imagine a colorable rationale, no matter how oppressive
or ill-justified that condition is in fact.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
353. 481 U.S. 739.
354. See id. at 741.
355. See id. at 746.
356. See id. at 739.
357. Id. at 759 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 758 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
359. See id. at 759 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 760 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Though the majority said that the justification for the Act
was not punishment, but regulation, Justice Marshall noted that the
[viery pith and purpose of this statute is an abhorrent limitation of the presumption of
innocence. The majority's untenable conclusion that the present Act is constitutional arises
from a specious denial of the rule of the Bail Clause and the Due Process Clause in protecting
the invaluable guarantee afforded by the presumption of innocence.
Id. at 762-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Indictment, however, is still a prerequisite to imprisonment:
Under this statute an untried indictment somehow acts to permit a detention, based on other
charges, which after an acquittal would be unconstitutional. The conclusion is inescapable
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Justice Marshall's final attempt to show the merger of due process and equal
protection came in Ford v. Wainwright361 in which the Court held that the infliction
of the death penalty upon the insane offended the Constitution.362 The majority
based its decision on the Eighth Amendment.363 In a portion of his opinion, joined
only by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, Justice Marshall found that the
Florida statute involved also failed the fairness test of the Due Process Clause."
Justice Marshall specifically found that the "fundamental requisite of due process
of law is the opportunity to be heard," and therefore, a procedure that denies a
prisoner to be heard on the issue of insanity is constitutionally flawed.365 Justice
Marshall also believed the procedure was flawed because the "opportunity to
challenge or impeach the state-appointed psychiatrists' opinions was denied."3"
The third, and what Justice Marshall thought to be the "most striking defect in the
that the indictment has been turned into evidence, if not that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged, then that left to his own devices he will soon be guilty of something else.
Id. at 764 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
361. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
362. See id. at 410. Florida's offending statute required the following:
Florida law directs the Governor, when informed that a person under sentence of death
may be insane, to stay the execution and appoint a commission of three psychiatrists to
examine the prisoner.... After receiving the report of the commission, the Governor must
determine whether "the convicted person has the mental capacity to understand the nature of
the death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed on him." If the Governor finds that the
prisoner has that capacity, then a death warrant is issued; if not, then the prisoner is committed
to a mental health facility. The procedure is conducted wholly within the executive branch,
ex parte, and provides the exclusive means for determining sanity.
Id. at 412 (citations omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985 and Supp. 1986)). See supra note
65 and accompanying text for a further discussion of this case.
363. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.
364. See id. at413-14.
365. See id. at 414. Justice Marshall wrote:
[C]onsistent with the heightened concern for fairness and accuracy that has characterized our
review of the process requisite to the taking of a human life, we believe that any procedure that
precludes the prisoner or his counsel from presenting material relevant to his sanity or bars
consideration of that material by the factfinder is necessarily inadequate.
Id. The prior year, in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,
held based on due process grounds that an indigent criminal defendant must have access to a psychiatric
examination and the assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense based on his mental condition
when his sanity at the time of the offense is seriously in question. See lid. at 86-87. See supra Part
IlI.A.6 for further discussion of Justice Marshall's concepts of due process in connection with a proper
defense in litigated matters.
366. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 415. Justice Marshall further opined that: "[w]ithout some questioning
of the experts concerning their technical conclusions, a factfinder simply cannot be expected to evaluate
the various opinions, particularly when they are themselves inconsistent." Id. (citing Barefoot v. Esteue,
463 U.S. 880, 889 (1983)).
349
procedures, was the State's placement of the decision wholly within the executive
branch."367
IV. CONCLUSION
It is probably unnecessary to attempt a summary of Justice Marshall's due
process jurisprudence, having just catalogued some 162 of his opinions on the
subject. A certain sense of completeness, however, seems to compel a short
summation.
As this Article has stated and attempted to show, fairness was the basic
foundation of Justice Marshall's concept of procedural due process of law. This
was not a new concept in due process jurisprudence; but Justice Marshall brought
to the Court a fresh approach to the subject. At a bare minimum, every litigant is
entitled to a competent, impartial tribunal,368 competent counsel to protect that
person's rights, and a competent, impartial second tribunal on appeal. The person
must be able to confront his or her accuser.3 69 The person must be allowed to make
an independent or an assisted determination of the rights to which he, or she, is or
was entitled.37 °
It is not every right, which when deprived constitutes a lack of due process, but
rather only fundamental ones. A fundamental right, whether it deals with substance
or procedure, is one which assures that the recipient receives the immediate and
mediate rights referred to above. A fundamental right, however, is more. It is a
right that the collective thinking of a free society considers essential to a
continuation of that free society.37 ' Justice Marshall was not satisfied that due
process was afforded if its absence would have made no difference in the outcome
of a proceeding. 72 Justice Marshall emphasized that "[wle recognized long ago
that mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper
367. See id. at 416. Justice Marshall explained:
Under this procedure, the person who appoints the experts and ultimately decides whether the
State will be able to carry out the sentence that it has long sought is the Governor, whose
subordinates have been responsible for initiating every stage of the prosecution of the
condemned from arrest through sentencing. The commander of the State's corps of
prosecutors cannot be said to have the neutrality that is necessary for reliability in the
factfinding proceeding.
Id.
368. "The right to an impartial jury lies at the very heart of due process." Smith v. Phillips, 455
U.S. 209, 224 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961))
(referring to a jury composed of a cross section of one's entire community, not just certain parts of it).
369. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
370. Justice Marshall wrote that "[a] prisoner does not shed his basic constitutional rights at the
prison gate." Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 466 (1989).
371. See Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207,209-10 (1971). "If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or matters of opinion." Id. (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
372. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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functioning of the adversary process. 373 Moreover, he was not distracted by
linguistics, but remained focused on the preservation of fundamental rights.374
Justice Marshall fully realized that the rights of all the governed, as repre-
sented by the government, must be balanced against the rights of individual
members of that body.375 He was not overwhelmed, however, by the business of
governing.376
When the situation was apposite, and the moment fortuitous, it was entirely
appropriate for the strong to protect those who, through no fault of their own, were
weak. A hierarchy of strength played an important part in Justice Marshall's
concept of fairness. He was acutely aware that some people are stronger than
others. His severest admonition was for those endowed with the strength to survive
to help their less able brothers to survive.
The strong cannot help the weak, however, unless they are truly strong, and
remain so. No more eloquent words can describe that axiom than Justice
Marshall's own, in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Salerno:
3 7
Throughout the world today there are men, women, and children interned
indefinitely, awaiting trials which may never come or which may be a mockery of
the word, because their governments believe them to be "dangerous." Our
Constitution, whose construction began two centuries ago, can shelter us forever
from the evils of such unchecked power. Over 200 years it has slowly, through our
efforts, grown more durable, more expansive, and more just. But it cannot protect
us if we lack the courage, and the self-restraint, to protect ourselves.
378
373. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985). Justice Marshall added that "a criminal trial is
fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain that
he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense." Id.
374. Justice Marshall regarded a procedure by what it did, rather than by what someone called it.
As an example, when trial de novo was for all intents and purposes an appeal, he said so. See Colten
v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 122-26 (1972). Justice Marshall's thinking was the same thinking that
prompted Sigmund Freud to observe that a society can be only as honest as its linguistic habits. See
ANN DOUGLAS, TERRIBLE HONESTY: MONGREL MANHATrAN IN THE 1920's 158 (1995).
375. Justice Marshall acknowledged that prisoners did not have a right to determine the place of
their incarceration. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 251 (1983). He also acknowledged that
sufficient security in a criminal trial was a necessity. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 572 (1986).
Even liberty, which Justice Marshall considered a precious right, could be denied where a sufficient
governmental interest conflicted. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 564 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
376. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). "[l]t is not
burdensome to give reasons when reasons exist." Id. at 591.
377. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
378. Id. at 767 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
He probably never thought of it in such terms, but. in his understanding of the
concept of due process of law, Justice Marshall found the Holy Grail that men have
been seeking for so many centuries.
